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THE VERTICAL EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP IN LAND
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S.

BALL

THE PROBLEM

The advent of the aeronaut has created the possibility of a
number of unprecedented factual situations to confront our
courts. The law has inherited, in its sonorous latinisms and
quaint medieval conceptions, a storehouse in which imagination,
quick to envision the unexpected outgrowings of society from its
legal garments, and delighting in the incongruities between doctrines and facts, may revel without stint. "Cuius est solum, eius
est usque ad coelum," pronounced Cino da Pistoia at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The thought of multitudinous
trespasses, quare clausum fregit, prompts a novel,' several more
technical books, and innumerable magazine articles. Some view
the matter with sly delight, others with frothing and unreasoning
anger, still others with impatience mingled with consuming interest. How far above the earth does the ownership of the holder
of the fee extend?
The problem brought to light in this somewhat spectacular
fashion was not necessarily, in other aspects, a new one. Man
has been extending his domain vertically on both sides of the
'Herbert Quick, "Virginia of the Air Lanes".
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surface of this planet ever since he became a builder or a digger,
and the law has had to reckon with this vertical extension of
power in many ways.
Elsewhere it has been contended that the machinery of the
law has, for a long time, included as a part a concept of land as
three-dimensional space-not the soil and rocks and vegetation
which we see about us, but a geometric concept with which we
explain phenomena-geometric space. 2 Without here discussing
the problem, it will be assumed that the real land, in the eyes of
the law, is so constituted.
The problem to which an answer is now sought is a different
one. The difference must be realized in order to understand
much that has been said by courts, legislatures, and legal writers.
We find that the most frequently given definitions of the term
land in analytical discussions are so phrased as to mark out the
ownership rights and their extent rather than to describe the concept.3 When we inquire as to the extent to which the law recognizes ownership, these usages of the term afford excellent criteria,
but they do not touch on the question of the nature of land.
A list of different views which have been advanced as to
the extent of land ownership vertically follows; it is not logically
complete nor exclusive of the possibility of other views, but it
seems to represent the main trends of thought on this subject. It
is only fair to remark that this is an inquiry into the field of
positive law, and is not a question in jurisprudence, as would be
that of the nature of land.
i. According to one view, the land which can be owned is
the material solid part of the earth. It is the soil, the rocks, the
minerals, and all that is naturally present in the crust of the earth.
This is a view which is at the same time natural and naive. By
implication, it excludes the land-space occupied by the material
solid from the realm of things which may be owned.
A man cannot own air in its free state; the rule is universal.
A man may have an easement for light, or an easement for free
'Article entitled The Jural Nature of Land, to appear in the current volume of ILL. L. REv.
For example, cf. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) § 155.
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access of air, or a right against the pollution of his air, but the
air itself he cannot own. Apparently it is then necessary to limit
ownership, under this view, by the surface; any rights possessed
by the owner involving acts or situations above the surface, while
evidence of the jural recognition of the land-space, are not rights
of ownership, and are incidental to, and follow, ownership of the
4

solid matter.

This view of the nature of land-ownership was in the minds
of the framers of the California Civil Code when they defined
land as the solid material of the earth.5 It also is the view which
has colored and affected the decisions of many judges, although,
as we shall see, the results of those decisions are often explicable
on other grounds as well.
2. Adopting the same view so far as to hold ownership to
apply to the material solid from the surface downward ad inferos,
another view would include the space above. This is part of the
true land-space, apparently, since it cannot consistently be supposed to be the free air. This is a welding of a material solid to a
geometric solid, the welding occurring at the surface, to form the
subject of ownership. This is the view suggested, though not
adopted, by Salmond:
"Considered in its legal aspect, an immovable, that is to
say, a piece of land, includes the following elements:
"(a) A determinate portion of the earth's surface.
"Hazeltine (HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE AiR [1911] 56, 57) points out
that there are some who would deny the landowner any rights at all in the
superjacent space, basing their argument on the communal nature of air. This
view he considers "quite untenable"; as can be easily demonstrated. After
reference to the cases, no one can doubt that what Dean Wigmore calls "appurtenant rights" in this space exist, even if not proprietary in nature.
'§ 659 of the California Civil Code reads: "Land is the solid material of
the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether
soil, rock, or other substance". § 829 reads: "The owner of land in fee
has the right to the surface and to everything permanently situated beneath or
above it".
These sections are from Field's draft of the New York Civil Code,
and are §§ 164 and 266 of that draft. They appear as §§ 257 and 358 of TIr.
i of S. D. REv. CODE (igig), and as §§ 525o and 5351 of N. D. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. (1913) ; but they do not seem to have influenced decisions in these two
states. The natural implication of these two sections is to require tangibility of
whatever is "permanently situated beneath or above" the surface to make it
subject to ownership.
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"(b) The ground beneath the surface down to the centre of the world. All the pieces of land in England meet
together in one terminable point at the earth's centre.
"(c) Possibly the column of space above the surface
ad infinitum." 0
As clear evidence of what he meant when he spoke of land
"considered in its legal aspect," Salmond adds these two additional elements:
"(d) All objects which are on or under the surface in
its natural state; for example, minerals and natural vegetation. All these are part of the land, even though they are in
no way physically attached to it. Stones lying loose upon
the surface are in the same category as the stone in a quarry.
"(e) Lastly, all objects placed by human agency on or
under the surface, with the intention of permanent annexa,7
tion. .
It is apparent that Salmond is here enumerating those things
which are subject to ownership and at the same time are placed
by the law in the category of immovables, including them all
under the term land; and that he is not attempting to formulate
any concept of the jural nature of land.
It is difficult to see why minerals had to be mentioned separately, when the second element included "the ground beneath
the surface down to the centre of the world." It would seem
that this would include minerals. Perhaps here Salmond has not
himself altogether escaped some of the implications of a view
later to be set out-that the land-space itself is subject to ownership both above and below the surface.
3. Under a third concept, ownership is limited to the surface; and to this ownership are attached certain "appurtenant
rights" in subjacent and superjacent space. This is the view
stated by Dean Wigmore, as follows:
"Land-Surface and Appurtenances. The property-right
in realty includes the surface-area of the land. It also in'SALMOND,

1Ibid.

loc. cit. supra note

3.
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cludes such appurtenant elements as serve to make the land
safe for habitation and completely- available for economic
use as a fixed headquarters of individual activity.
"The following elements are thus included:
"Superjacent Space. The space superjacent to the land
is included, without limit as to distance upwards. The
right also protects the superjacent space from the intrusion
of such substances as may, by impairing the health of the
owner, thus violate his right of Corporal Integrity, .or by
impairing the use of his bodily sense, thus violate his rights
of Sensory Comfort.
"The space subjacent to the land is included without
limit as to distance downwards. The right in this aspect
protects merely against an intrusion into the lower soil or
a removal of it. But an act which causes the surface to fall
"8
.
is a violation of the main rights.
This "surface-area" of Dean Wigmore is probably a twodimensional geometric concept. It is not likely that the "landsurface" is to be construed to include the soil of the surface.
That would mean that we would again be making the subject
of ownership rights a three-dimensional material solid, comparable to the one already described above, but with a boundary, indefinitely located, a few feet below the surface. There would
seem to be no practical utility in treating land as a material solid,
and then distinguishing it from an entirely similar, often much
more valuable, solid of identical composition beneath, subordinate
or "appurtenant" only because of its position. The surface might
be an exposed bed of iron ore, not fit for agriculture, beneath
which there might be a bed of clay covering a second bed of ore.
Where could we draw a line and say, here ceases land-here begins minerals? Yet this is probably what has been in the mind
of courts at times.
It seems much more probable that Dean Wigmore's idea is
that of a two-dimensional geometric concept, a surface; not an
Euclidian plane, since it follows the contour of the earth's crust,
'WIGMOal,

SELECT CASES oN TORTS (i912), appendix A Summary of the

Principles of Torts at 878.
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but a surface without thickness.9 Land is that upon which metes
and bounds are laid out.
We hope that it is not a complete misunderstanding of the
view of Dean Wigmore to say that, according to it, the bundle
of rights accompanying ownership involves and includes:
(a) Principally, the right of ownership, the content of
which is related to a two-dimensional geometric concept, landsurface.
(b) Secondarily, rights not of ownership, the contents of
which relate to the rest of the land-space, which may be considered, since it is divided at the surface, as two geometric solids.
(c) Rights relating, in content, to the things which are considered annexed to the land-surface. 1 0 These annexed solids include all those that would be termed land under the first view
given above. They would include as well so-called fixtures,
buildings and other man-made structures. Minerals, fructus
naturales,and houses are eiusdern generis under this explanation;
all are chattels which have become realized, or subjected to the
laws of real property because of a factual relationship.
These annexed solids are undoubtedly the subject of ownership, although the fact may not become apparent until they are
separated and become personalty. This ownership, however, is
incidental to and acquired by ownership of the surface, since it
is only exceptionally of separate importance before the physical
severance of the solids; as where coal in situ -is owned separately
from the surface. The emphasis is always on the surface; injury
to land, in the strict sense, is injury to the surface under this view.
The ownership of the solids beneath the surface results from the
presumption created by the maxim already discussed."
p. 3: "That which has position, length,
'TAYLOR, PIrr PRESS EUCLID i-ii,
and breadth but not thickness is called surface . . . The word surface in

ordinary language conveys the idea of extension in two directions; for instance,
we speak of the surface of the earth, the surface of the sea, the surface of a
sheet of paper. Although in some cases the idea of the thickness or the depth
of the thing spoken of may be present in the speaker's mind, yet as a rule
no stress is laid on depth or thickness. When we speak of a geometrical surface,
we put aside the idea of depth and thickness altogether".
"Annexation is a factual relationship recognized by the law to exist
between two things.
An interesting attitude toward such a view is indicated by Demolombe:
"En g~nral, cette expression: le sol, comprend le dessus et le dessous riunis
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It may be that Dean Wigmore's view and that suggested by
Salmond are essentially the same. Salmond notes as his first
element, "A determinate portion of the earth's surface." He
does not indicate that the rights of ownership apply peculiarly to
this element, as does Dean Wigmore; in fact, he discusses whether
there may be ownership in air-space. For this reason, we have
considered Salmond to have listed this element only as- one of
several subject to ownership.
There can be no doubt that the law places great emphasis on
the surface. Nothing could be more logical. The original appropriation of land was nothing more than appropriation of the
exclusive use to a tillable surface.12 The word land in law
meant at first only arable land. A chief justice of the State of
Pennsylvania once stated the reasons why the law should attach
so many presumptions to the surface, and why it is such a focus
for rights of ownership in land:
"In the earlier days of the Common Law, the attention of buyers and sellers, and, therefore, the attention of
the courts, was fixed upon the surface. He who owned
the surface owned all that grew upon it and all that was
buried beneath it. His title extended upward to the clouds
and downward to the earth's center. The value of his estate
lay, however, in the arable qualities of the surface, and, with
rare exceptions, the income derived from it was the result
of agriculture. The comparatively recent development of
the sciences of geology and mineralogy, and the multiplication of mechanical devices for penetrating the earth's crust
have greatly changed the uses and the values of
lands.

.

." 13

et consid&rs comme une seule chose, comme un seul bien. Le dessus et le dessous
sont, en effet, le 6lments constitutifs du sol lui-m~me; le sol ne se pourrait
pas rnme concevoir sipari, d'une manire absolue, du dessus et du dessous; car
ilne serait alors qu'une espce de surface g~ometrique sans aucune 6paisseur;
ilne serait qu'une abstraction! Lois donc que Yon parle du sol, on y comprend
toujours le dessus et le dessous, comme 6lments constitutifs et comme parties
integrantes du sol lui-m~me": DEmoromBE, TRAITP- DE LA DISTINCTION DES
BIENS 561. Planiol remarks:T "Le proprift6 fonci6re ne se reduit pas .une
simple surface sans epaisseur : PLANIOL, TRAIT- UL]MENTAIRE § 2391, p. 745.
'Cf. SG-wvcK, ELEMENTS OF POLrICS (z89i) 62 et seq.
11Paxson, C. J., in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 At.
597 (1893).
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It remains to be seen what effect these changed uses and
values have had on the rules of law.
4. A fourth view is that the land-space is subject to ownership both above and below the surface. Here the surface assumes no individual uniqueness, except insofar as the physical
limitations of man locate most of his acts there.
This geometric solid, this cubical space, must be distinguished carefully from the physical matter which exists within
it, much of which is, of course, subject to ownership as a distinct thing. Presumably there is matter, however tenuous, occupying this to the limits of the stratosphere. Furthermore, it must
be remembered that such a geometric solid is a concept, and may
or may not square with reality. It must be distinguished, also,
from the hypothetical ether, as those who have discussed trespass
by radio waves may not have done, unless they have considered
the ether as a form of matter in itself subject to ownership.
According to this view, the rights which make up ownership
relate in their content to the space above and below the surface as
a unit. The effect of easements and other overshadowing rights
in others, which often arise out of the limitations imposed by nature, may sometimes give color to a belief that ownership has a
different effect below and above the surface than directly at the
surface.
We must notice that there are differences in detail among
those who apparently lean toward this fourth view. These differences arise over the extent of the space which is subject to
ownership. These differences may also exist as to the air-space
among those who adopt the second view given above. The problem has two aspects.
(a) Whenever ownership is held to extend to more than
the surface, it is usually held to extend downward ad inferos.1"
It has been pointed out, following a geological hypothesis, which,
it is well to note, is much less credited today than formerly, that,
14 There is no problem of the extent of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the
state here involved which needs solving before protection can be afforded to
unlimited ownership rights, since "it is a universally recognized rule of the Law
of Nations that the subsoil to an unbounded depth belongs to the State which
owns the territory on the surface." I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d

ed. (1920)

§ 173, p. 312.
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if the center of the earth is a molten mass, and hence a fluid,
ownership has no significance below the comparatively slight
scratchings which we can make on the earth's crust.' 5 It cannot be denied that the phrase usque ad inferos involves much of
the apparently absurd and useless. Our deepest mines reach but
a few miles under the surface, and it takes the imagination of a
Jules Verne to picture man ever finding it possible to penetrate
much deeper. Nevertheless, there is no need of setting a limit
on the depth of what the law will recognize as a fit subject of
ownership until some situation arises demanding such a solution.
Occasionally we find a limit suggested, as in the German Civil
Code; but even then the application is not altogether obvious.l 6
(b) The problem is different with regard to the space superjacent to the surface. 17 The advent of the airplane brought with
it the necessity of adjusting our legal views to a changed world.
An analysis of ownership in what was conveniently called superincumbent space resulted in four divergent views of what the
law was, or, perhaps, what the law ought to be in the opinion of
those advancing the views.'
We are not considering here the dispute as to the sovereignty of a nation over its superincumbent air-space which excited publicists a few years ago.' 9 There appears to be little
article, Aviation. and the Law, (1917) 21 LAW NOTES 170.
"'See B. G. B., § 9o5.
"Cf. article, supra note I5, where the writer bluntly expresses his view
'Cf.

in these words: "The 'up' theory has much less in it than the 'down' theory, and
even the 'down' theory, as we have intimated, is mere theory".
' See, generally, for the last exposition of these views, HAZELTINE, LAW OF
THE AIR 74-75 and 56-58; DAVIDS, LAW OF MOTOR VEHICLES (I911) 285 et seq.;
LYCKLAMA,

Am SOV=REIGNTY

(1910)

11-30.

" Ibid. There is an extensive literature on this subject. Three distinct
views, each with its variants, received support from various publicists:
First, the air is free. This received its classic formulation in the resolution
phrased by M. Paul Fauchille, and adopted by the Institute of International Law in 19o6: "Art. 7. L'air est libre. Les Rtats n'ont sur lui en
temps de paix et en temps de guerre que les droits necessaires, a leur conlIa police
servation. Ces droits sont relatifs a la r~pression de l'espionnage,
douani~re, a la police sanitaire et aux n6cessit~s de ]a defense". i9 ANNtUAIRE DE
(1902)

19; 21 ANNUAIRE

(1906)

320.

L'INSTITUT BE DRoI

INTERNATIONAL

INT'L PUBLIC (ig0I)

v. 8; I REV. JURIDIQUE INT'LE DE LA LocomoTIoN A-R-

Fauchille himself, while firm in his advocacy of aerial liberty, would have
recognized a 15oo meter "zone of protection": FAUCHiLLE, REV. GEN. DE DROIT
RIENNE 135. Some publicists, such as Bluntchli, Nys, and D'Hooge would have
recognized no such "zone theory": D'HooGE, DROIT A REiN (1912) pp. 1-10.
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dissent since the World War to the proposition that a nation is
sovereign to the heavens, so far as its power to repulse foreign
planes is concerned. Presumably, if there was no sovereignty
there could be no rights of private ownership, which, of course,
are dependent in their existence on a sovereign to enforce them.
(i) The first view regarded ownership as extending no
further upward than the surface of the earth and structures
thereon. Holders of both the first and third views previously
set out would of course be found here. Salmond, despite his
Aerial liberty, but with such zones of sovereignty or protection, was advocated
by Rolland, Bonfils, Von Holtzendorf (Iooo metres) and Bonnefoy, among
others, in addition to Fauchille: BONNEFOY, LE CODE DE L'AiR (igog); BONFILS,
MANUEL, pp. 315-317.

The second main view may be best represented by the one advanced before
the Institute of Internation Law by Westlake in opposition to Fauchile, namely,
that the state is sovereign without limit of the airspace, but that this sovereignty
is subject to a right or servitude of innocent passage: Meurer, Stockton, Hazeltine, and Hershey are typical supporters of this view: STOCKTON, OUTLINES OF
INT. LAW (1914), § 164, pp. 357-9; HERSHEY, THE ESSENTI.AS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1912), pp. 232-235; HAZEL INE, Op. cit.
supra note 4.
The third view was that of absolute state sovereignty. Early supporters
of this view were Grunwald, and Lycklama. The tendency before the World
War was toward either the second or third view. However, Lawrence, in Ipio,
believed that "the fundamental principle on which all rules must be based is not
yet settled". LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 19lo),
§ 73, PP. 146, 147. Cf., also, Blewett Lee, Sovereignty of the Air, (1913) 7
Am. J. INT. LAW 470. During the World War, the nations apparently acted
on the third view, that of absolute sovereignty: Rolland, Les pratiques de la
guerre airrienne dans le conflit de 1914 et le droit des gens, (1916) 23 REvuE
G9NAR
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 497; Bellot, Sovereignty of the
Air, (igi8) INT. L. NOTES, v. 3.
The Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, adopted in
1919 by the Peace Conference, contains this provision: "Art I. The high
contracting parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the air space above its territory": 17 AM. J. INT. LAW, Doc.
Supp. 195; also to be found in Brit. Treaty Series 1922, No. 2; Parl. Papers,
192o, Cd. 670; and Senate Doc. No. 91, 66 Cong., Ist Sess. This has met with
general approval. Cf., for example, OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW pp. 354,
See also discussion by Blewett Lee, The International Flying Convention and
the Freedom of the Air, (1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 23 and article, Spaight,
Aerial Law, in Enc. Brit. (13th ed.). Wilson considers that this principle,
absolute juridiction, is now universally admitted: WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (2nd ed. 1927), §33, PP. 77; §48, pp. 116-120. He adduces the famous case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (192o), as an
approval and application of the doctrine.
Art. 2 of the Convention provides: "Each contracting State undertakes in
time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory and
territorial waters . . . to the other contracting States, provided that the
conditions established in this Convention are observed". For those nations which
have signed this Convention, this passage also affects the rights of private landowners, since they doubtless cannot object to a passage authorized by treaty.
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suggestion of another view, apparently belongs in belief to this
2
group.
(2) For a second there was coined the descriptive term,
zone theories. These, by the application of several different tests,
limited the extent upward of what could be owned. 21 Pollock,
for example, advanced the test of "effective possession." Just
what effective possession is, is obscure. Yet this doctrine has
Remarks by Justice Holmes in three cases before our United States Supreme Court indicate his view as to the extent of sovereignty: "In that capacity (as quasi-sovereign) the state has an interest independent of and behind
the titles of its citizens in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air :" Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 2o6 U. S. 23o,
(i9o6). "It is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and representative of
the interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the
water, and the forests within its territory": Hudson City Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349 (19o8).
Finally, Holmes clearly distinguishes between
sovereignty and ownership: "To put the claim of the state upon title (to wild
and migratory birds) is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in
the possession of anyone, and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole
foundation of the states's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds
that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow maybe in another state, and in a week
a thousand miles away. If we are to be accurate, we cannot put the case of
the state upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that for the
moment are within the state borders, that it must be carried out by officials of
the United States within the same territory, and that but for the treaty the
state would be free to regulate this subject itself": Missouri v. Holland, 252
U. S. 416 (192o).
" SAL-MOND, THE. LAW OF TORTS (5th ed., 192o), §52, p. 197: "It is submitted, however, that there can be no trespass without some physical contact
with the land (including, of course, buildings, trees, and other things attached
to the soil) and that a mere entry into the airspace above the land is not
an actionable wrong unless it causes some harm, danger, or inconvenience to
the occupier of the surface. When any such harm, danger, or inconvenience does
exist, there is a cause of action in the nature of a nuisance". This, of course,
is a denial only of proprietary rights, not of appurtenant rights.
Kuhn's view may be classified here: "The view here favored, by which the
landowner's rights in the airspace are regarded as strictly appurtenant to the
soil and to be accorded only when essential to the enjoyment of the latter, will
tend to reconcile the interests of the landowner with the progress of the new art
(aviation)". Kuhn, The Be.qinnings of apt Aerial Law (910) 4 Amr. J. INT.
LAW 109.

According to this view trespass would lie only when there was actual
physical contact with the soil or structure on it. Cf. article, Aviation and the
Law, loc. cit. supra note 15, where this view is upheld. A passage in Bonnefoy discussing article 552 of the Code Napoleon, is appropriate here: "En somme,
l'article 552 ne vise que les constructions et plantations fixdes au sol et s'6levant
vers le ciel, mais non le domaine adrien lui-m~me qui constitue une res communis insusceptible de propri~t6 priv~e. Mf. Julliot critique, et A bon droit cette
opinion en faisant remarquer que c'est confondre l'espace g~ometrique qui est audessus de ]a propri~t6 avec l'air qui y circule, le contenant et le contenu":
BONNEFOY, LE CODE DE LAIR, p. 124.
'Cf. DAVIDS, 10c. cit. supra note 18.
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been repeated unquestioningly by several writers. 22 Hazeltine
criticizes its indefiniteness. 23 Others set the limit at the height of
actual user, as determined by buildings or other structures, with
the right of further appropriation, of course, reserved.2 4 Still
others speak of the "usable air column." 25 All of these limits
were difficult both of definition and of application.
(3) The third type retained the idea of ownership indefinitely upward, but subjected the upper strata to a natural easement for aerial navigation. 26 Although nothing has as yet appeared which can possibly raise the question, it would seem
logical to believe that such ownership would be limited by the
stratosphere.
Cf. Rannells, Aerial Navigation in the Law of Trespass, (1919) 4 ST.
Louis L. REV. 2o5; article on Aviation, etc., (910)
71 CENT. L. J. i.
Pollock's statement of the doctrine is to be found in the following passage:
"It does not seem possible on the principles of the Common Law to assign any
reason why an entry above the surface should not also be a trespass, unless
indeed it can be said that the scope of possible trespass is limited by that of
possible effective possession, which might be the most reasonable rule
Clearly it would be a trespass to sail over another man's land in a balloon
(much more in a controllable aircraft) at a level with the height of ordinary
buildings, and it might be a nuisance to keep a balloon hovering over the land
even at a greater height". PoLocK, THE LAW OF TORTS (i2th ed. 1923),
351, 352.

"HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE AIR, 73: "One difficulty lies in the indefinite
and ever varying height of the lower zone of possession and ownership.
The zone of possession and ownership of one landowner would be very high,
and the zone of his neighbor would be very low; and even in the case of the
same landowner his zone of possession and ownership would vary with the
height of his structures on the land, and might even be partly determined by
the fact of his owning one or more air-vehicles with which to enforce his rights
in that part of the airspace which is his." Valentine also rejects Pollock's "effective possession" test: Valentine, The Air-A Realm of Law, (I9IO) 22
JURID. REV. 95.

Miraglia applies the Ihering limitation of "Practical interest," and applies
it to ownership in the column of air and landspace: MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1912), §294, p. 476.
SHAZELTINE, LAW OF THE AIR, 57. Planiol holds this view.

'Comment (I9=) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 88.
"Davids states this as follows: "The air domain of a proprietor may be
utilized by him to any extent, but in so far as he has not appropriated it, it must
be deemed to be subject of passage by aviators. The case is analogous to that
of the highway upon which the public have a right of passage, while the fee
remains in the owner of the abutting land". DAViDS, op. cit. supra note 18,
§ 2W0, p. 292.

There is a variation of this view which would grant to the aviator a
license rather than an easement. Chapin believes that "the doctrine of free
passage-i. e., that aerial flight is not per se trespass-would seem in accord
with sound policy," but that the aviator passes at his peril, being absolutely
liable for actual damage.

§ 75, P. 349.

CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS (0917)
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2
Hazeltine inclines to this view. r
(4) The fourth type regarded all invasions of superincumbent space as trespasses or invasions of ownership.2 8 ,
The problems arising from aerial navigation will be noticed
somewhat more fully later.
Because of the lack of direct adjudications on the subject,
and because of the variance of views held by different writers, we
find suspended judgments on the question on the part of other
writers. Thus, in a well-known English textbook, we find this
passage:
"Whether the maxim . . . is to be accepted literally as meaning that the ownership of land carries with it
the possession of the column of air situate above it, or
whether it is to be interpreted as meaning merely that a
landowner is entitled to complain of any occupation by
others of the space above him which materially interferes
with his enjoyment of his land, seems doubtful." 29

The variant views as to the extent of ownership vertically
set out above are not academic in that they have never been
tested by actual application. They are set out in the belief that
all of them have at some time or another been used by courts in
the solution of actual problems, or at least have been suggested
by students of the law as the modi operandi by which courts have
" HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE Am 77. Yet Hazeltine appears to differentiate
between upper and lower strata: ". . . this proprietary right (just stated

to be unlimited) is subject to a general right of passage for balloonists and
aviators; who must, however, keep themselves strictly within their right of passage and must do no act which shall amount either to a trespass or a nuisance
in the lower, or to a nuisance in the upper, stratum of the airspace:" ibid.
Terry apparently held this view, and in a passage expressing it we find
a clear distinction made between air and the space it occupies: "The condition
of the air, as distinguished from the space above the land-which latter is fully
protected so that it seems that it would probably be a theoretical trespass to
pass over a man's land in a balloon-is protected, I think, only as against influences tending to defile it," and this to a limited extent: TERRY, PRIxCIPLES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1884) § 388, p. 379.
Another expression of the same view is to be found in Reeves: "I can
restrain my neighbor from swinging his shutters out over my roof; and he
who, without my permission, digs into my soil a thousand feet below the
surface, or stretches a telegraph or telephone wire over it, or flies in an airship thousands of feet above it, is guilty of trespass": I REEVES, REAL PROPERTY
(i90o)

113, §97.

' CLERK AIND

LINDSELL, LAW OF TORrs

(7th ed.

1921)

333.
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reached certain decisions. Our problem is to discover, if possible,
which view is the one of most general application, and which
possesses the greatest utility in dealing with legal problems. It
therefore becomes necessary to examine the decisions of the
courts with a view to discovering upon what grounds they must
be explained. This is done with no expectation of discovering
uniformity, or of forcing all the cases into a single category. 30
II.

OWNERSHIP

Before pursuing our inquiry into the extent of ownership
in the land-space, it is, of course, desirable to know what ownership is. This question is not so easily answered as one might presume. In general, we find two different types of definition: first,
ownership is a particular relation between a person and a thing
(or a right) ; second, ownership is an identifiable right or complex of rights.
I. The most inclusive definition of the first type is probably
that of Salmond. Ownership, to him, "in its most comprehen'A difficulty might be injected into the discussion by reference to restrictions which are sometimes placed by statute on the height of buildings in
cities. Thus, Paris has prohibited building above the height of the Eiffel tower:
BAUDRY-LACONTINERIE, §338. Art. 552 of the French Civil Code, regarding
ownership of land, expressly states that the use of it is subject to police regulations. Cf. also PLANIOL, TRAIT- PILtMENTAIRE, §§ 2333,2334, P. 725.
Numerous legislative enactments of a similar nature have come up to the
appellate courts of this country for adjudication, and have been generally
upheld. See, for example, the following cases: Att'y-Gen. v. Williams, 174
Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77 (i899); Parker v. Commissioners, 178 Mass. i99, 59
N. E. 634 (igoi); Williams v. Parker, 158 U. S. 491 (i9o3) ; People ex rel.
Kemp v. D'Oench, iiI N. Y. 359, i8 N. E. 862 (1888) ; Cockran v. Preston,
io7 Md. 2o, 7o Atl. 113 (19o8) ; Welsh v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E.
743 (i9o7). Cf., also BERRY, RESTRICrIONS ON THE USE OF REAL PROPERTY
(i915) §§ 57, 58, pp. 87 to 89. The basis for such legislation, in order to avoid
constitutional inhibitions, must be "the safety, comfort, and convenience of the
people and the benefit of property owners generally" (to use the words of the
Massachusetts court in Att'y-Gen. v. Williams, supra).
It would seem plausible, at first, to assume that such a prohibition takes
away ownership, if it previously existed, in the space above the limit of user
set by statute. This does not necessarily follow. Restrictions on types of
buildings permitted in given areas are the essence of zoning ordinances, and
similarly effect user; yet they are not regarded as changing the status of the
owner. The height of permitted construction may be raised at any time in
the same manner it was established. Other acts of user, such as flying kites
from the roof, may exist. The situation is thus not analogous to the taking
of a tract of land for a park, or other divesting of ownership; all that is
done is a particular restriction on user, without prohibition of all user, or
without taking away the owner's remedies, if any, against invason of his
superjacent space.
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sive signification, denotes the relation between a person and
any right that is vested in him. That which a man owns is in
all cases a right that is vested in him." m In the same way, Salmond speaks of the "possession of a right."
This usage causes
Salmond to consider any discussion of the ownership of things
as involving, by necessity, a logical elipsis 3 3 Salmond's usage
seems to be opposed to that of the profession generally; and
Professor Cook, in criticizing this view, has pointed out that no
such logical necessity in reality exists, if the nature of persona?
be properly understood. A man "does not own the rights; he
has them; because he has them, he 'owns' in very truth the material object concerned." 14
Ownership may also be regarded as a relation between the
owner and the thing owned. Thus Markby, though elsewhere
defining ownership as a right, at one place speaks of it as being
the relation between a person and a thing.
It is possible to view
ownership as a factual relationship between a persona and the
concept of a thing, and thus furnish an example of what Professor Kocourek would call "infra-jural relations." 3S Professor
Kocourek's definition of ownership adopts this view: "Ownership is the infra-jural relation of the dominus of a jural relation
to a jural thing which can be economically enjoyed." w
2. The more usual definition of ownership treats it, in form
at least, as a right or a complex of rights. The Romans considered it as composed of or including a number of ira: ius disponendi, ius utendi, is abutendi, ius fruendi, etc. Austin defines
it as a "right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of
§ 86, p. 277.
a "We shall see that the possession of a right (possessio juris, Rechsbesitz)
' SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE

is the de facto relation of continuing exercise and enjoyment, as opposed to

the de jure relation of ownership". Ibid.
"'We speak of owning, acquiring, or transferring, not rights in land
or chattels, but the land and chattels themselves. That is to say, we identify
by way of metonymy the right with the material thing which is its object. This
figure of speech is no less convenient than familiar": ibid. § 87, p. 278.
"Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law, (1q21) 28 YALE
L. J. 721, at p. 729.
' MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW (4th ed. 1889) § 324, P. 16o.
' KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS (1927) 307.

" Ibid. c. i8, on Things, § 7.
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disposition, and unlimited in point of duration, over a determinate
thing." 38 Holland remarks that it is very difficult to define it,
and adopts Austin's definition as perhaps the best. 89 Amos
also expresses agreement with Austin, and formulates a parallel
definition.

40

It must be noted that, while these definitions take the form
of rights, they involve the idea of relation more than of right
in the technical sense. An indefinite right of user involves no
necessary constraint on the liberty of others. The act of user on
the part of the owner is not, therefore, the exercise of a right,
in the sense of a jural relation, but is the exercise of a liberty.
In a very true sense the right of user involves the idea of a factual relation between the owner and the thing. This may be made
clearer by another passage in Austin: "The right of property or
dominion (in so far as the right of user is concerned) may be
resolved into two elements: first, the power of using indefinitely
the subject of the right (thing); secondly, a power of excluding
others (a power which is also indefinite) from using the same
subject." 41 The first element, being a liberty only, suggests the
infra-jural relation; the second element, at least with respect to
material things, is nothing more nor less than the right to the
possession (which is, in essence, an unpolarized claim to be in
the infra-jural relation of possession). Thus these definitions
are not entirely dissimilar to those first discussed.
Salmond himself defines that right, the ownership of which,
according to his view, is treated as the ownership of the thing, as
"a right to the entirety of the lawful uses of that object," which
(3d ed. 1869) 817.
(9th ed. igoo) I95.
4"Two
great leading divisions of Rts of Ownership . . . between
them comprehend all conceivable Rights of Ownership: Dominium, or Absolute
Ownership, in which the Mode of User, Duration of the Right, and facilities of
Alienation are unlimited or indefinite": AMos, SCIENCE OP JURISPRUDENCE
(872) 149.
The less considered definitions of the ordinary textbook are of this same
general form. Thus: "ownership chiefly imports the right of exclusive enjoyment": WILI.AMS, REAL PROPERTY (24th ed. 1926) 2.
Compare also the definitions of Planiol and Baudry-Lacontinerie: PANIOL,
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE § 2329, p. 723; BAUDRY-LACONTINERIE, DES BIENS § 199,
2

AUSTIN,

"HOLLAND,

Pp. 149, 150.
412

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE

JURISPRUDENCE

AISTI,. LEd URES ON JURISPRUDENCE.

Lect. XLIX, p. 836.
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emphasizes the same elements. 42 Gareis gives a similar defini43
tion.
According to Terry, dominion, or full ownership, "is made
up

.

.

.

of the right to possess and the right to use"wan

analysis very similar to that of Austin quoted above.4 4 After
stating that the "right of property" is a complex right,45 Terry
examines one by one the various other rights so often- included
in the complex, as the right of alienation, the right to waste, and
the right to take fruits. 46 His analysis indicates that such
"rights" are also liberties, although the distinction was never
made by him; and that they are not essential elements of ownership.
The question remains whether it is possible to define ownership in terms of true rights or jural relations. The idea of ownership as a complex of rights has, as we have seen, been a common
one. 4 This complex, of course, is capable of being cut down
by the alienation of an indefinite number of the rights which
compose it.48 What, then, is its mark of distinction, its badge
of uniqueness? Terry speaks of the "indeterminate residuum
of rights" after the splitting off of a determinate group.49 Markby
has stated that "an owner might be described as the person whose
rights over a thing are only limited by the rights which have been
detached from it." 50 Salmond also contributes to this view. 5 1
" SALmoND, JURISPRUDENCE § 87, p. 28o.
4' GAREIS, SCIENCE OF LAW (1911), § 2o, p.

i39: "The essence of ownership
is legal control over a thing in the totality of its connections. This idea is as
extensive as the possibility of use".
"TERRY,

PRINcIPLEs § 281.

"Ibid., § 345.
"Ibid., § 349, P. 343; § 384, p. 377; § 383, p. 376.
"Cf. Professor Cook's remarks: "To say that A owns a piece of land is
really to assert that he is vested by law with a complex-exceedingly complex,
be it noted-aggregate of legal rights, privileges, powers, and immunities--all
relating, of course, to the land in question": Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions,
28 YALE L. J. 721, at 729.
(92i)
" "There seems to be no conceivable way or combination of ways of
using a thing which cannot be broken off from the general right of use and
erected into a separate right": TERRY, PRINCIPLES, § 390, p. 380. Terry terms
them .fragments of the dominion".

"TERRY,

PRINCIPLES, § 387, P. 378.

MARY, ELEMENITS OF LAW, §318, p. i56.
"He, then, is the owner of a material object who owns a right to the
general or residuary uses of it after the deduction of all special and limited

648

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

It is evident that this residuary right is not merely the last one
retained. This is demonstrated by the ability of the owner to
sell land retaining a profit of mining. It must be a right of a
peculiar nature.
A remark of Gareis is suggestive: "These rights of another
may be so extensive that there may remain to the owner only an
ultimate right of reversion, or ius recadentice." -52 It is submitted that this is recadentice can best be defined as the right to the
ultimate possession, although such right may be postponed until
after the death of the doMiinus,53

This definition can apply only

to the ownership of things susceptible of possession, and it may
be that professional usage includes as things which may be owned
some which by their nature are not subject to possession.5 4 We
are not here concerned with that problem. Neither by adopting
such a definition of the right of ownership do we intend to deny
the existence of the infra-jural relation of ownership. The two
concepts, while distinct, are always concomitant with each other
when material things are involved. For our next purpose, discovering the tests by which we can ascertain the extent of ownership, -we may emphasize the right.
Although ownership is here defined as a single right, it is not
meant to negative the usual existence of a number of associated
rights. The right to the ultimate possession is probably an unrights of use vested by way of encumbrance in other persons": SALMOND,
§ 87, p. 280.
" GA.mxs, ScIENcE OF LAW, § 20, p. 139.
03 Professor Kocourek recognizes a similar right of ownership: KOCOUREK,

JURISPRUDENCE,

c. I8, §8.
Holland considers the right to possess "inherent in ownership" unless ex-

JURAL RELATIONS,

pressly severed: HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 2o8. Holmes is in agreement. "But
what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those incident to possession. . . . The great body of questions which have made the
subject of property so large and important are questions of conveyancing, not
necessarily or generally dependent on ownership as distinguished from possession": HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (I88I), 246. Cf. WILLIAmS, REAL
PROPERTY, p. 2: "The right to maintain or recover possession of a thing as
against-all others may, we think, be said to be the essential part of ownership".
If this is so, every encumbrance on land can be regarded, to that extent, as a
postponement of the right to the possession.
That the idea of ownership as distinct from the right of possession of land
and chattels, in both the Roman and Common Law, was a gradual growth from
the idea of the right to possessiorq, is clearly pointed out in an interesting article:
Thayer, Possession and Ozotership, (1907) 23 L. Q. REv. 175, 314.

THE VERTICAL EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP IN LAND

649

polarized claim against the world in general, together with polarized claims against all having more immediate or narrower possessory rights. In itself it possesses the nucleus of a very extensive
complex of rights, and usually we find with it a number of
associated rights.55 Such would be the appurtenant rights in
the superjacent space if Dean Wigmore's view of the extent of
vertical ownership proved to be the correct one. The definition
is intended chiefly to provide the most nearly infallible means of
identification. 56
The idea of ownership of land presents a difficulty which
needs disposition here. Since the Statute of Quia Emptores the
strict legal theory in England has been that there can be no
owner of land except the Crown, 57 and the fee simple of the tenant is merely an incumbrance on the ownership of the Crown.5 s
However, this distinction between the fee simple of land and the
complete ownership of it, is, as Salmond says, "a matter of form
rather than of substance." 59 In the United States and elsewhere, what is called a fee simple is usually equivalent to com'As an illustration of this association of rights, the interesting discussion
by Holmes of easements "inhering in a thing" points out that easements "have
become an incident of land by an unconcious and unreasoned assumption that a
piece of land can have rights". Thus, once an easement is acquired, it follows
the possession of the dominant tenement into the hands of a disseisor: HOLMES,
THE COMsltoN LAW 381-409. . Cf. 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE
(4 th ed. 1879), 846, 847; Sims, A Study of the Rights Incident to Realty, (i92i)
7 VA. L. REv. 327; (1922) 8 ibid. 317. This is an instance of a right which
arises because of the recognition by the law in another connection of the infrajural relation of possession. It is thus elliptical, as Holmes pointed out, to
speak of the easement as "belonging to the land".
'A distinction should be noted here between ownzership and property.
Property is undoubtedly a broader term, in whichever of several senses it is
used.
" Since no strict-type legal relations, involving constraint, can exist between
the sovereign and its subjects, the ownership of land by the State is to be termed
such only by analogy. Cf. 2 AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 55, Lect. XLIX, at 83o.
The ownership of land, because of its social 'indispensability, is hedged about
with limitations much more so than that of chattels. Eminent domain and
escheat are examples; and the police power of the State is an inexhaustible
source of others. These limitations must not be regarded as affecting the
essence of ownership.
'Cf. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY 6, 7; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 154, P.
447; TmRY, PRINCIPLES § 45, P. 33; 2 BL. CoMM. 105.
'SALMOND,
JURISPRUDE CE, § 154, p. 448; WILLIAMS, op. cit.
note 58. "It possesses, indeed all the incidents of absolute ownership except
the form".

"pra
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plete ownership, and our tenure of land is all allodial. 60 We shall
consequently overlook this somewhat technical distinction, and
regard the fee simple tenant as an owner in the same sense as
the owner of a chattel.
III.

TESTS FOR EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP

If the right of ownership be defined as the right to the ultimate possession, it is evident that ownership does not exist where
possession is not recognized although the nature of the thing
would permit it. Also, when possession of a thing is recognized
and protected by the law, it would seem that ownership must of
necessity also exist. An exception to this latter proposition seems
to occur where the positive law of a state, as in Soviet Russia,
expressly abolishes "private property," but permits possession
on the basis of "rights of enjoyment." This somewhat anomalous situation may be regarded in two ways: first, the right to the
ultimate possession is still recognized, but is inseparable from the
right to the immediate possession; second, the right to the ultimate possession has a meaning only when there can be an ultimate
as distinguished from a present possession, and hence does not
now exist in Russia. Since the express intent is to abolish private ownership, and the first solution would be somewhat inartistic in its retention of an unnecessary concept, the second view
61
seems the preferable one.

In determining the vertical extent of ownership in the landspace, the cases of most value will be those which treat of acts
which have been or are to be performed either above or below
the surface, and which refer to the land-space. Such cases will
show whether the acts, when performed by another than the
owner, are breaches of the duties imposed by the owner's claims.
A difficulty arises from the fact that there is no form of action
in the Common Law in use today which may be brought by an
"' TERRY, 10C. cit. supra note 58.
Per Woodward, J., in Pierson v. Armstrong, i Iowa 282 (855), "We, in general, own our land in simple absoluteness,
and need not talk of allodium or free and common socage".
., The State does not become the owner, and the possessor a tenant, since,
as has been previously remarked (supra note 57), real ownership by the'State
is an inherent impossibility.
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owner simply because of his ownership. The two propositions
with regard to possession offer a partial solution of the impasse.
If the act which has been performed above or below the surface
is held to violate a possession, we may assume that a present right
to the possession, and hence an ultimate right to the possession
(or ownership) is recognized by the law in that which is invaded
by the act above or below the surface. The opposite deduction
can be drawn from an opposite holding.
This solution requires a fundamental assumption-that the
law can conceive of possession of space. Detention and prehension are ideas which are applied to the factual evidences of possession, and a first reaction rejects them as applicable to the relation of a human being to space above. This difficulty is one which
confronted the courts in several of the decisions later to be considered here.
We find this passage in Savigny: "By the possession of a
thing, we always conceive the condition in which not only one's
own dealing with the thing is physically possible, but every other
person's dealing with it is capable of being excluded." 62 The idea
of exclusion of others is as easily applied to land-space as to landmatter. Can one "deal" with space? Since all objective human
acts require space for their performance, those usually admitted
as evidence of possession of land are as applicable to space as to a
quantum of matter. In fact, their only relation to land-matter is
in the spatial element of their definition. Except for the act of
delivery of seisin in medieval law, possession of land never involved a prehension, or its similar ideas, in a lay sense; a juridical
extension of ideas applicable to chattels is the source of confusion.
There need be no logical difficulty in the application of the concept of possession as a factual relation to land-space.
Reference to the formal distinctions between actions is received with less and less favor as procedural strictness is relaxed;
but in this discussion some consideration must be given to the
technical nature of certain forms of action at law and suits in
equity.
'SAVIGNY,

PossEssloN

(6th ed. 1848) bk. I, §i.
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i. Trespass on the case for nuisance involves no violation of
an ownership or possessory right; the act affects other claims of
the landowner or possessor, such as those to his corporal integrity, to his undisturbed use of the surface of the land, to what
Dean Wigmore calls his "sensory comfort," and the like.0 3 The
nature of case for nuisance is best understood by comparing it to
trespass quare clausum fregit. In trespass the claim of the owner
is for the non-violation of his undisturbed possession.14 A breach
of the duty correlative to this claim by the trespasser imports
damage; every trespass (or act, the negative of which forms the
content of this claim), no matter how small, imports damage in
strict common-law jurisdictions. 6' The maxim, de mninimis non
curat lex, has no application here. Nominal damages at least can
be recovered, at least in states which have not abolished such a
recovery. On the other hand, case for nuisance requires the
proof of actual damage; the act complained of is not in violation
of any duty unless such damage results. Lord Justice Vaughan
Williams differentiated them as follows:
"An action of nuisance is different from an action of
trespass. An action of trespass is the action which was
That there may be an actionable nuisance though the defendant own no
land (no servient tenement) apparently was settled in the case of Lyons and
sons v. Wilkins, [I899] 1 Ch. 255.
""Trespass is the wrongful disturbance of another person's possession of
land or goods": POLLOCK, TORTS 348. Cf. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY 57n.
However, one entitled to have the possession at the time of the trespass can
bring the action: Ryan v. Clark, 14 Q. B. 65 (1849); Ward v. Taylor, i Pa.
238 (1845) ; Hersey v. Chapin, 162 Mass. 176, 38 N. E. 442 (1894) ; Fitch v.
Boston & P. R. Co., 59 Conn. 414, 2o At. 345 (i9o) ; JAGGARD, HANDB0OK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS (1895) § 212, pp. 663, 664; UNDERHILL, TORTS (ioth ed.
1922) art. 127, p. 273. But he must have ousted the actual possessor and be in
possession before he can succeed in the action: Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Slee,
33 I1. App. 42o (1889) ; Potter v. Lambrie, 142 Pa. 535, 21 Ati. 888 (1891) ;
Wood v. Michigan Air Line R. Co., 90 Mich. 334, si N. W. 265 (1892);
JAGGARD, TORTS, loc. cit.; UNDERH1LL, TORTS, loc. cit.; Ryan v. Clark, 14 Q. B.
65 (1849) ; Butcher v. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 399 (1827). Such entry relates back
to the time of the trespass: Anderson v. Radcliffe, El. BI. & El. 8o6 (Eng.
1858) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Ilford Gas Co., [i9o5] 2 K. B.
493; UNDERHILL, TORTS, loc. cit.
For the possessory remedies of German Law, cf. B. G. B. §§ 861, 862. For
an historical discussion, see Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass,
(1917) 27 YALE L. J. 220.
Entick v. Carrington, ig How. St. Tr. 1O29 (Eng. 1765). Pollock, speaking of the rule in this case, remarks, "'Property' here as constantly in our books,
really means possession or a right to possession": PoLLocx, TORTS 350.
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brought where the body of the land of a person had been
invaded. An action of nuisance is the action which was
brought where there was no invasion of the property of
somebody else, but where the wrong of the defendant consisted in so using his own land as to injure his neighbor's." 66
The difference is significant for our purposes because a
recovery in nuisance for an act cbmmitted physically above or
below the surface means no more than that what Dean Wigmore
would call an appurtenant right of the landowner has been violated; while a recovery in trespass means that the court has considered that there is something above or below the surface the
possession of which may be violated, unless in some way the act
67
is considered to be a violation of the possession of the surface.
2. In cases of a continuing nuisance, or a permanent nuisance, where damages attainable by the action at law would not be
adequate, a suit in equity may be brought. The line of demarcation here is not so easily drawn, since what is known as a continuing trespass may be treated as a nuisance for purposes of this
suit or similar suits. In such cases the reasoning of the court is
our best guide as to what is actually decided by the decree.
3. A third remedy at law which has significance for us is
the action of ejectment. Shorn of its historical fictions, the gist
of the action is the violation of a duty correlative to the claim of
the landowner or possessor to have the possession of a thing,
, In Kine v. Jolly, [1905] I Ch. 480. A breaking into or upon land is the
whole gist of the action: Cubitt v. Porter, 8 B. & C. 257 (1828).
a Cf. the following passage from Wigmore: "The right which protects
this Interest (in Realty) is a right to exclude other persons from the Thing;
in particular, that the thing shall not be, at the hands of the obligor,
a. impaired in its materials.
b. intruded upon in its space

. . .

(entering a house without any con-

ceivable impairment of it) : WIGMORE, Summary of the Principles of Torts, in
2 SELECT CAsEs ir

TORTS 857, 858. A little later he adds (p. 858). "Whether

an intrusion into the airspace above land is a trespass, depends on the scope of
the Interest as governed by the principle of §102 (supra). Impairment of
affluent elements (air, water, electricity, etc.) would be regarded as a trespass
on the case". It is interesting to note Dean Wigmore's phrase, "intruded upon
in its space", in connection with his view as to the nature of land.
Hazeltine remarks concerning the case of Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219
(Eng. 1815) : "Now I take it that Lord Ellenborough has here touched upon
the test as to whether or not the column of air is in the ownership of the one
owning the land below it-that test being, namely whether or not an action of
trespass will lie for interference with the column of air in the space above
the land": HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE AiR 65.
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which thing must usually be in the category of so-called corporeal hereditaments. Here the immediate claim is to be restored
to the possession. 68 The difference from trespass is summed up
in the word ouster-a rather difficult legal term.6 9 To maintain
ejectment, there must be an ouster of the plaintiff from a possession to which he is entitled.7 0 Another requirement usually
added to the bringing of the action is that the possession can be
delivered to the plaintiff by the sheriff under the writ of habere
facias possessionem which accompanies the judgment. 7 ' A judgment in ejectment brought for an ouster either above or below
the surface is even stronger evidence than trespass of the existence of a right to possession of the land-space and, presumably,
ownership of it; 72 unless, again, such an ouster of possession
"The plaintiff must show a right of possession or right of entry in himself: Payne v. Treadwell, 5 Cal. 310 (1855); McMasters v. Torsen, 5 Idaho
536, 51 Pac. ioo (1897) ; Jones v. Lofton, I6 Fla. 189 (1877) ; Barco v. Fennell,
24 Fla. 378, 5 So. 9 (i888); Farley v. Craig, i5 .:N. J. Law 191 (1836);
Lawrence v. Hunter, 9 Watts 64 (Pa. 1839) ; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 43i
(U. S. 1832); Love v. Simms, 9 Wheat. 515 (U. S. 1824); Kirk v. Hamilton,

U. S. 68 (i88o).
op. cit. supra note 8, at 859.
'Cf. Wioito,
"The defendant must be in possession at time action is brought: Garner v.
Marshall, 9 Cal. 268 (1858) ; Jones v. Lofton, 16 Fla. i89 (1877) ; Scisson v.
McLaws, 12 Ga. 166 (x852); Reed v. Tylor, 56 Ill. 288 (187o); Ellicott v.
1O2

Mosier, 7 N. Y. 2Ol (1852) ; McIntire v. Wing, 113 Pa. 67, 4 Att. 197 (1886);

and many other cases.
71Tenn., etc. R. Co. v. East Alabama Ry. Co. 75 Ala. 56 (1883) ; Beatty v.
Gregory, 17 Iowa iog (1864); Farley v. Craig, I5 N. J. L. i91 (1836); Child
v. Chappel, 9 N. Y. 246 (1853) ; Hancock v. McAvoy, I5i Pa. 460, 25 At. 47
(1892).

" Some difficulty in applying the action of ejectment to intrusions, especially below the surface, arises from a modification of the original requirements
of the actions. In the early case of Vilson v. Mackreth, 3 Burr. 1824 (Eng.
1766), it was held that trespass lies in favor of any one with an exclusive right,
as of turbary. Following this case, in Comyn v. Kyneto, 2 Cro. Jac. i5o (Eng.
16o2), ejectment was allowed for a coal mine and a boyllery of salt, although
the coal mine was only a profit, of which there could be no possession. This
was reaffirmed in Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. K. B. 16q, 95 Eng. Rep. 748 (Eng.
1763), where the basis was stated to be that a mine is an interest in land. In
Alabama State Land Co. v. Thompson, 104 Ala. 570, 16 So. 44o (894),

ejectment was allowed without discussion for "minerals reserved" in a deed.
This was followed by Moragne v. Doe dem. Moragne, 143 Ala. 459, 39 So.
161 (1904), where it was held that ejectment will lie to recover a mineral interest
in lands.
The rule of these and similar cases has been interpreted to be that ejectment may lie for a so-called incorporeal hereditament, if capable of physical delivery. Thus the grant of a right to quarry and remove stone from land for a
specific purpose is sufficient foundation for an action of ejectment: Reynolds v.
Cook, 83 Va. 817, 3 S. E. 710 (1887): accord, Integral Min. Co. v. Altoona
Min. Co., 75 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896). Cf. 9 R. C. L. 831. There is
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73
can be construed to be an ouster of possession of the surface.
For purposes of convenience, our inquiry can be divided,
first, with reference to acts to be performed above the surface;
and second, with reference to acts to be performed below the
surface, noting also the points of similarity in result, if any exist.

IV.

EXTENT OF OwNERSHIP IN SUPERJACENT SPACE

We have noted four possible views regarding the space
above the earth; but three of them adopt the same general point
of view, with minor variations, so that there are two principal
attitudes to be taken: first, it is a subject of ownership; second,
it is not subject to ownership, and invasions of it are only actionable when they are breaches of duties otherwise owed the
landowner.
great confusion among the rious urisdictions at this point. The courts speak
of "entering into possession." of mining rights: Beatty v. Gregory, supra, note
7x; Kirk v. Mattier, 140 Mo. 23, 41 S. W. 252 (1897) ; Karns v. Tanner, 66
Pa. 297 (187O). There can be no possession in a real sense of an incorporeal
hereditament. If the rule was based on a possession of land under the incorporeal hereditament, it might be understandable; but the same courts refuse
ejectnment for an exclusive license, even when a right to a mineral or oil as
a chatte is given if found: Union Pet. Co. v. Bliven Pet. Co., 72 Pa. 173 (1872).
This modification of the usual requisite of the action of ejectment decreases
its usefulness as a test of the ownership of space beneath the surface, as it is
oftentimes difficult to discover just what the allowance of the action means.
See, generally, note, Right of owner of interest in mineral in situ to maintain
ejectnIent, (925) 35 A. L. R. 234; and note, (i9o6) ii6 Am. St. Rep. 568.
Assuming for a moment that possession of the land-space, as distinct from
either the soil matter or the geometric surface, is recognized by law, it may be
asked what sort of an intrusion should be regarded as disturbing it. The instinctive answer would require space-occuping matter, either animate or inanimate. If so, gas, smoke, and bad odors (having, undoubtedly a material embodiment) would answer the description, and it is doubtful if the question
has ever been raised in court, since the invocation of other remedies requiring
less bizarre reasoning is generally possible. What logic requires material substance as the intruding agency? We find numerous remarks, both by textwriters and by the authors of decisions, which suggest that an intrusion by
the projection of force answers the requirement. Cf., for example: Forbell
v. City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644 (igoo); Watson v. Mississippi, etc., Co., 174 Iowa 23, 156 N. W. i88 (1916); Louden v. City of Cincinnati, go Ohio St. i44, io6 N, E. 970 (1914); CHAPrN, ToaTs § 75, P. 350
and note.
Several different types of force entirely dissociated from a material embodiment might be enumerated: vibrations, as those caused by blasting; which
affect the material mass of the land; attraction, as that of a vacuum, as in
the Forbell case, supra; electricity, which may be the passage of electrons;
hertzian waves, as in the suggested trespass by radio. The question may have
some implications for our theory of the identity of land; for instance, vibrations
which affect the surface of the land may alone be treated as trespasses, suggesting the idea of land as a geometric surface. It is, however, practically
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Acts to be performed above the surface which involve an
invasion of the air-space are of several kinds. 74

Chief among

them are:
i. The allowance of trees, shrubs, or other natural growths
to overhang neighboring land.
2. The raising of projecting structures.
3. The stringing of wires across land.
4. Physical intrusion by man or his agents into the space.
5. Firing of projectiles through the space.

6. The passage of balloons, airplanes, and the like through
the air-space.
It is assumed that in each of the above instances the act is to be
performed without any contact with the material of the land the
possession of which is invaded.
i. Overhanging natural growths.

Apparently neither tres-

pass 75 nor ejectment -' lies for an invasion of the air-space over
one's land by the trees, shrubs, or other natural growths belonging to a neighbor. Neither is any easement created in favor
of him who owns the trees.7"
On the other hand, overhanging trees or vegetation growing
entirely from adjoining land, which actually cause damage, constitute a nuisance.7 8 The landowner, however, is allowed remeirrelevant here, and the discussion will be confined to intrusions by spaceoccupying matter, outside of gas, smoke, and odors.
"For general discussion of cases on this subject, see the following notes:
Ejectment for Encroachments on Land above the Surface, (19o6) 19 HARV.
L. REV. 369; The Air Space as Corporeal Realty, (1916) 29 HARv. L. R~v.
525; Trespass by Airplane, (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 569; Trespass by
Acts above Surface, (1926) 42 A. L. R. 945 (where it is stated that "the orthodox common law rule is that any intrusion into the air-space above the land of
another amounts to a trespass"); (1go6) 116 Am. St. Rep. 568. See also, i
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 251, who remarks: "Whether the owner of land,
in the ordinary sense, actually owns the air space above the land

.

. . is

a question of difficulty".
"Lindley, L. J., in Lemmon v. Webb, 11894] 3 Ch. D. i: "I can find no
authority for the proposition that an action of trespass would lie in such
a case".
76I R. C. L. 401; 9 ibid. 858.
" Lemmon v. Webb, [1895] A. C. i.
7'Crohurst v. The Burial Board of the Parish of Ambersham, 4 Ex. D.
5 (1878) (plaintiff's horse poisoned by eating from overhanging branches);
Smith v. Giddy, [19o4] 2 K. B. 448 (plaintiff's fruit trees damaged by defendant's
overhanging trees) ; Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, II Pac. 623 (1886).
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dies more speedy and effective than case for damages. He may
summarily abate the nuisance by trimming back the overhanging
branches.7 9 He has also the right to a mandatory injunction.80
The right to cut back is solely due to the existence of a nuisance, and not because the owner of the land overhung has any
property right in the parts which overhang.8 1 This is an illustration of where the maxim, cuius est solunt, etc., does not apply
strictly. It necessarily follows that the owner of the tree is entitled to all the fruit, and to the branches which have been cut
82
off.
The mere denial of trespass and ejectment in these instances
throws little light on our problem. Trespass did not lie at common law for a non-feasance. 83 The act which Is relied upon to
breach a duty in this case, if the duty exists, is a negative one,
a- non-feasance-the non-prevention of the overhangs. Overhanging trees are multitudinous in number; to allow an action
in every case would lead to endless litigation, with no purpose
served. These cases are not therefore based upon a non-recognition of possession of the air-space; in fact, they avoid that problem, and are decided on other grounds.
We may safely conclude, therefore, that nothing in the rules
Lemmon v. Webb, supra note 77; Hickey v. Michigan Central Ry. Co.,
96 Mich. 498, 55 N. W. 989 (1893);-Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, 11
Pac. 623 (1886) ; i R. C. L. 401. The situation is paralleled by intruding roots
below the surface. Thus, in Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, (1884), case
for nuisance lay when roots intruded and polluted a well. Summary abatement if actual damage results was allowed in the Grandona case for roots as well
as branches. Accord, Herndon v. Stultz, 124 Iowa 440, ioo N. W. 329 (19o4).
Actual damage must be proved both above and below the surface. The French
law on this subject is similar: BAUiDRY-LACONTINERI, DES BIrNS §§ 332, 337.
' Grandona v. Lovdal, supra note 79; Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77 Mo. App.
262 (1898) (only in case of necessity).
"tLyman v. Hale, Ii Conn. 177 (1836).
' Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 2o (1872).; cf. I R. C. L. 4O.
Justice Lott remarked: "The rule or maxim giving the right of ownership to
everything above the surface to the owner of the soil has full effect without
extending it to anything entirely disconnected with or detached from the soil
itself". This can be accepted with the comment that to construe the maxim
usque ad coelum to include in the ownership of land the ownership of all things
above has never been the inflexible rule of the courts. That maxim, and superficies solo cedit as well, are mainly rules of construction and the source of
certain presumptions, generally rebuttable. The existence of a tree as a thing
distinct from the other legal thing, land, is clearly recognized by the rule which
makes adjoining neighbors tenants in common in a tree on the boundary.
$ 2 JAGGARD, LAW OF ToRTs (1895) § 21r, p. 661.
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of our law with regard to overhanging trees furnishes an argument one way or another as to the extent of ownership in landspace.

s4

2. Structures raised by man. We come now to a subject
which has been much discussed in the courts. The situation
arises when a building or other structure is raised wholly on one
side of a boundary line, some part of which projects across the
line and overhangs the adjacent plot. 5
As early as I6II, Baten's. Case 86 had advanced the rule
that where the defendant built a house which "did jut over" the
plaintiff's messuage, case for nuisance was sustained. ST In the
celebrated case of Pickering v. Rudd, 8 Lord Ellenborough was
moved to remark concerning the rights of aeronauts by the allegation that a board was projecting over another's land, as a basis
for trespass quare clausurn fregit. The proof did not materialize, and Lord Ellenborough's remarks were therefore relegated
to the condemned classification of dicta.8 9
Thirty years later a cornice, aggravatingly throwing water
on an adjoining lot which it overhung, was adjudged a nuisance,

" See note, Rights and remedies in case of encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, (1922) 18 A. L. R. 655. The
German law in this field is discussed by SCHUSTER 388, 389; HUEBNER,
HISTORY

264.

"'No man may erect any building or the like to overhang another's land":
2 BL COMM. I8. The following passage from Baudry-Lacontinerie gives us
a summary of the French law: "Le propri~taire du sol n'a pas seulement la
libert6 d'Elever des constructions, de faire des plantations, mais le droit exclusif
qu'il possde sur la colonne d'air situ~e au-dessus de son fonds lui permet aussi
d'arr~ter les empitements des tiers sur ce domaine arien, d'exiger la d&molition
des constructions en saillie sur sa proprift6, ]a suppression de la portion des
batiments dont la projection verticale atteindrait le sol qui lui appartient":
BAUDRY-LACONTINERIE, DES BIENS §337.
"9 Coke 53b (I6II). Compare this case with one in the Digest which is
considered a possible source of our old friend, the maxim: Dig. xliii, 24 fr. 22,
§ 4. An interdict Quod vi aut clan could be raised against one who interfered
by a projectuin with the free airspace above the burial ground of a neighbor
(sepulchrum).
" Still earlier, in I598, in Penruddock's Case, 5 Coke ioo (598), the court
had held that a quod pernittat well lay against an overhanging house.
"4 Camp. 219 (Eng. 1815).
Hazeltine remarks: "We may well believe that Ellenborough inclined
rather to the opinion that trespass could only be committed by some actual
physical contact with something visible. . . . It seems clear that his legal
reason for hesitation was that .
. in the case of the flight of the
aeronaut, he could see no interference with the possession of the land itself":
HAZELTINE, LAW OF THE Am 65.
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but one from which the law would infer injury, so that there
was no need of proving rain had fallen.Y0 The declaration was
in case, and the court held that it was not to be construed as alleging a trespass. This was held because there was nothing in
the allegation negativing the possibility that it was lawfully there,
since the maxim usque ad coelum was a rebuttable presumption
and not always applicable. The case was that of Fay v. Prentice."' In the course of the argument, Maule, J., indicated that
unless there was evidence to rebut the maxim it would have been
a trespass, saying: "I think there is no doubt but that trespass
would lie here; but can the plaintiff maintain case without showing some consequential damage?" 92
The courts of the United States have uniformly treated such
projections at least as nuisances. Thus, in the early case of
Pierce v. Lemon, 3 in an action of trespass on the case, Gilpin,
C. J., charged the jury that if they found that a roof or cornice
projected, "it would constitute an unlawful and wrongful encroachment upon his property and an injury to his possession of
it and his legal rights to it." Case for nuisance for an overhanging wall was allowed in Langveldt v. McGrath.94 It is to be noted
that the action in that case was originally ejectment, but was
changed to case by consent of the parties.
California seems to recognize no other form of redress
than nuisance. In Meyer v. Metzler, 5 a leaning brick wall was
abated as a nuisance on the ground that the plaintiff was thereby
prevented from raising and repairing his own building. In Kafko
"Discharging

roof water by spouts on to plaintiff's land is a trespass:

Conner v. Woodfill, 126 Ind. 85, 25 N. E. 876 (189o).
n I C. B. 828 (1845).

One text book raises a question which does not seem to have occurred
to any court or other text writer. "Even assuming from the particular facts
of the case that there is a right of property in the overlying airspace, it must
still be a matter of some doubt whether under a lease of the surface the possession of the air space will pass so as to render the lessee the proper person to sue
for a trespass upon it. The question has never yet arisen, but probably the lessor
would not be held to have assigned greater than was necessary:" CL= AND
LINDSELL, TORTS 334.

'2 Houst. 51g (Del. 1862).

"33 Ill. App. x58 (i889).
S951 Cal. 142 (875).
Accord, Barnes v. Berendes, r39 Cal. 32, 72 Pac.
406 (1o3).
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v. Boz-io,"' such a situation was held to be a continuing nuisance
for which successive actions will lie. The case here is especially
interesting because of the remarks of Myers, J., as follows:
"The wrong here complained of was an encroachment, not upon
the plaintiff's land, but upon the space above the land, and therefore was not a trespass but a nuisance." This is due to the inescapable implication of the definition of land laid down in the
California Civil Code, which has been already noted. We may
conclude that ownership, in California, does not include the airspace above; and that encroachments into that air-space are violations of other than proprietary rights, or of proprietary rights
to the surface by indirect disturbance of the enjoyment thereof.
Massachusetts expressly approved and applied the doctrine
of Baten's Case and of Fay v. Prentice in Codman v. Evans.9 Here the declaration was held to be a good count in an action of
case in alleging the wrongful keeping or continuing of the projection. Bigelow, C. J., in the course of his opinion, remarked:
"It inay be that an action of trespass might have been
brought for the erection and continuance of the structure
described in the declaration.
We are not called
on to decide that."
In Harrington v. McCarthy,98 the Massachusetts court
granted a mandatory injunction in the case of a projecting cornice, though it was over a private driveway and not actually
harmful, because the encroachment was intentional. Making
no distinction above and below the surface, the injunction was
refused as to occasional stones in the foundation which projected,
as they were unintentional encroachments, and for them the
plaintiff was left to his remedy at law. 9
191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753 (1923).

"89 Mass. 431 (1863).
i169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897).

See, generally, note: Nuisance by encroachment of walls or other parts
of building on another's land as permanent or continuing, (924) 29 A. L. R.

839. In accord with the principal case: Young v. Thedieck, 28 0. C. A. 239
(Ohio I918) (mandatory injunction against cornice projecting over another
building without causing injury) ; Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 15o Pac. 962
(1915) (projecting eaves ordered removed in equity) ; Lyle v. Little, 83 Hun
532, 33 N. Y. Supp . 8 (1895) (overhanging wall enjoined).
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There is not so much uniformity as to whether trespass quare
clausum fregit will lie. California, as we have seen, expressly
refuses the remedy. However, in the Massachusetts case of
Smith v. Snith,100 trespass was allowed for projecting eaves,
and Codman v. Evans was cited as authority. In New York
mandatory injunctions were allowed in Hall v. Sugo 101 and
Crocker v. ManhattanLife Ins. Co. 10 2 The first case was one of
projecting eaves, and the second was one where the part of the
building which projected was high in the air. The court based
the injunction, not on the ground of nuisance, but on that of continuing trespass. In the case of Puorto v. Chieppa,'0 3 a projection of one inch was held a trespass for which at least nominal
damages lay. Where the crossarms of telephone poles extended
over adjoining land, the Kentucky court found a continuing trespass.10 4 In the case of Esty v. Baker,10 5 trespass was allowed for
running a shaft under a bridge on a passageway, in the air, without touching a timber or the ground. The court considered this
a "breaking of the close."
Whether or not ejectment will lie for protruding superstructures has been the occasion for much debate. An inferior
New York court allowed ejectment for an overhanging wall in
an early case, Shcrry v. Frecking.106 The appellate division of
In Lawrence v. Hough, 35 N. J. Eq. 371 (1862), it was held that the
defendant was entitled to cut off overhanging eaves, and an injunction against
his doing so was refused. Summary abatement, without notice, upheld in case
of overhaging eaves and spout: Copper v. Dolvin, 68 Iowa 757 (1886).
French courts have ordered the destruction of a wall projecting over a
neighbor's land: Cass., 15 juill. I9OI, S. 1902, L XI7., and note by M. Naquet.
Cf. PLANioL, TRAiTt PLUMENTAIRE § 2329, p. 723.
1o0iio Mass. 302 (1872).

App. Div. 632, 6I N. Y. Supp. 770 (1899).
App. Div. .226, 7o N. Y. Supp. 492 (I9OI) (in lower court, 31 N. Y.
Misc. 687). See comment on this case, (190) 14 HARV. L. REv. 300.
"0178 Conn. 4o, 62 AtI. 664 (igo5).
0146

161

' Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Barnes, 3o Ky. L. Rep.

1290,

1I

S. W. 301 (1907). In Harris v. Central Power Co., iog Neb. 500, I9I N. W.
711 (1922), it was considered that a power company would have to secure

permission from landowner abutting on highway to project its cross arms
over his land.
2048 Me. 495 (i86o).
In Gifford v. Dent, (I926) W. N. 336 (Eng.), an
English court held a projecting sign a trespass. Projecting eaves were held not
to trespass, dictumn in Bureau v. Marshall, 55 Mich. 234, 2i N. W. 304 (I884).
1004 Duer 452 (N. Y. i855).
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the Supreme Court, which had no power directly to overrule the
case, disapproved of it in the case of Aiken v. Benedict.1 07 The
plaintiff in that case alleged projecting eaves and gutters, cited
the maxim, and claimed dispossession. The court replied:
"This was undoubtedly a violation of the rights of the
plaintiffs, but we think ejectment, or an action to recover
the possession of real estate, was not the appropriate remedy. Of what has the defendant taken possession which
belongs to the plaintiffs? Clearly nothing but an open space
of air over the material land of the plaintiffs. How could
the sheriff put the plaintiffs in possession of that space? It
is not perceived how it could be done. If it could be done
in one case, it could be done in every case, without reference
to the locality of the space, provided it be superincumbent
to the plaintiff's soil." los

In logical development of this chain of thought, the court intimated that the proper remedy for the plaintiff was in case for
nuisance. It was not until the Butler case,1" 9 which will be discussed later, that the Court of Appeals was called upon to pass
directly upon the question.
In the meantime, several other jurisdictions had been called
upon to decide the matter, and quite frequently the early New
York cases were cited. Ejectment was allowed in Vermont for a
projecting roof in the case of Murphy v. Bolger.1 0 Here the
court was very explicit in their reasoning, and the opinion of
Tyler, J., shows an entirely different conception of the effect of
the projection than that of the New York lower court:
"Could the plaintiff maintain ejectment for the intrusion? If not, it would be because the intrusion was not upon
the land itself, but the space above it. If he could not mainBarb. 400 (N. Y. 1863) Accord, Vrooman v. Jackson, 6 Hun 326
(1876) (in same court).
'As has already been noted, ability of the sheriff to deliver possession
under a writ of habere facias possessionein is a requisite to the allowance of
ejectment, and the New York court was committed to the doctrine: Child v.
Chappel, 9 N. Y. 246 (1853). In Jackson v. May, 16 Johns. 184 (N. Y. 18ig),
language of the court was to the effect that ejectment would only lie for something attached to the soil.
'Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716 (i9o6).
10739

I"6o Vt. 723, 15 AtI. 365 (I888).
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tain ejectment, he would be obliged to submit to the invasion, and only have his damages therefor. The law, however, says the land is his even to the sky, and therefore he has
a right to it, and should not be compelled to part with any
portion of it upon the mere payment of damages by the
trespasser.
Especially significant is this remark:
"The plaintiff was disseised of his land, and the defendants were in the wrongful possession by their projecting roof."
Here there can be no doubt that the court considered the airspace above the surface subject to possession.
Wisconsin has worked out an interesting doctrine in regard
to ejectment for projections both below and above the surface.
In McCourt v. Eckstein,"" the court held that a six-inch projection of defendant's foundation wall was a disseisin sufficient to
support ejectment. Dixon, C. J., doubted this, believing the remedy to be trespass, since this was a "casual and unintentional
trespass upon the land of another without claim of title." The
court apparently was not disturbed by the problem which troubled the New York court-the delivery of possession by the
sheriff. It was several years before the problem was again presented by the second appeal in the case of Zander v. Valentine
Blatz Brewing Co. 112 In this case an encroaching foundation
wall was again involved, but a building of the plaintiff's occupied
the surface over the projection. After citing previous cases for
the doctrine that certain acts could be treated by the plaintiff at
his election as an ouster, or otherwise as a trespass, the court
said of the plaintiff before it:
"He has not treated it as a disseisin. On the contrary,
by allowing his building to remain upon the. foundation, and
by occupying that building up to his line continuously, he
has undoubtedly elected to treat the defendant's act in building the wall as a mere trespass."
Wis. 148 (867).
195 Wis. 162, 70 N. W. 164 (897).

= 22

664

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

Here the action of the plaintiff in occupying the surface gave
him possession, so that he could not bring ejectment, but was
constrained to seek damages in trespass. Apparently possession
of the surface was the possession of the land.
The next year the case of projecting eaves came up in Rasch
v. Noth.113 The plaintiff's eaves also overhung the strip of land,
being built under the defendant's in such a manner as to carry
the water from defendant's roof onto the defendant's land, together with water from plaintiff's roof. Here again ejectment
was refused, on the same ground as the Zander case, that the
plaintiff had elected not to treat the projection as a disseisin.
While nothing was said as to the possession of the surface, it is
to be inferred that the plaintiff had not lost his possession, as was
evidenced by the position of his own eaves. The court suggested
trespass or the abatement of a nuisance as remedies for the plaintiff to seek.114 The next case, Rahn v. Milwaukee E. R. & L.
Co.,"' 5 was similar to the Zander case, and so the court noted in
its opinion. Coming back to a case of eaves, the court, in Huber
v. Stark," 6 stated: "This state is committed to the doctrine that
if, notwithstanding the encroachment, the owner of the premises
invaded really occupies up to his boundary line, fhe proper action
and redress for the interference is one for damages, or to abate
the aggression as a continuing nuisance." The court granted an
injunction against the continuing trespass in order to prevent the
acquisition of an easement of eavesdrip.
A final statement of the doctrine is to be found in Beck v.
Ashland Cigar and Tobacco Co.: 117

"The doctrine is therefore firmly intrenched in this
state that when there is an intrusion into the premises of
another either below or above the ground, but he is undisturbed in his possession of the surface of his land up to the
' 99 Wis. 285, 74 N. W. 82o (1898).
" In Christensen v. Badger Improvement Co., 187 Wis. 598, 204 N. W. 51o
(1925), a landowner was allowed summarily to remove an overhanging gutter,
after he had given notice of his intention to do it.
5 iO3 Wis. "467, 79 N. W. 747 (1899).
s 124 Wis. 359, lO2 N. W. 12 (1905).
227146 Wis. 324, 13o N. W. 464 (191).
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true line, his remedy is trespass and not ejectment, and, if
the trespass is a continuing one, equity has jurisdiction
thereof."
The two most significant features of this doctrine are, first,
that the rule is identical both above and below the surface, and,
second, that there has to be dispossession or ouster at the surface
to support ejectment. 1 18 All of the cases assume, however, that
if there was no evidence of user at the surface, either sort of
projection would be basis for ejectment. We have the choice
of two explanations; ownership is only of the surface; or the
column of land-space is juristically indivisible, and possession
of the surface is possession of all. The first might seem the
more natural, if it were not for the fact that trespass is allowed,
which would seem to show fairly conclusively that the court
recognized ownership in the column of land-space.
The Delaware case of Haitsch v. Duffy 119 did not decide
the question for that jurisdiction, the Court noting that there
was a difference of opinion, but that a mandatory injunction had
never been refused, if not on the ground of trespass, then on that
of nuisance. An injunction was therefore granted without specifying the ground. In a Minnesota case, Johnson. z.Minnesota
Tribunte Co.,12 0 the defendant had remodeled and inserted parts

of his structure beyond the necessities of a party wall. The
court speaks of the occupancy of "space," indicating a certain
trend of thinking; but the case is hardly in point since the intrusion, although above the surface of the soil, was nevertheless into
a structure affixed to the soil, and ejectment in such cases has
been generally recognized. The only English case at all relevant,
apparently, involves a projection placed on the top of a party
wall, and so is subject to the same irrelevancy as the Minnesota
case. 12 1 The Nebraska courts have followed the Butler case
2
without question, and allow ejectment.1
u"See remarks concerning this doctrine in note, (i9o6) I9 HARV. L.
369. The belief is there expressed that it is based on a fallacy.
239
io Del. Ch. 280, 92 At. 249 (1914).
=gI Minn. 476, 96 N. W. 321 (1904).
'Stedman v. Smith, 8 El. & BI. 1 (1857).
I McDivitt v. Bronson, ioi Neb. 437, 163 N. W. 761 (1917).
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Two jurisdictions apparently deny the remedy entirely. In
the Connecticut case of Norwalk Heating and Lighting Company
v. Vernam, 1 2 3 a projecting cornice and eaves were held to be

an "invasion of a right" but not "an ouster of possession." The
question was not raised by the bringing of ejectment. There
had been a conveyance to the plaintiff after the projection had
been built, and in a suit brought against him the defendant contended that the conveyance was void since the grantor had been
ousted at the time he conveyed. Quoting Baldwin, J., in reply:
"The possession of the adjoining proprietor remains
unaffected, except that it is rendered less beneficial. The
possession and occupancy of the projecting structure has no
effect on the ownership of the soil beneath, unless it be
maintained under a claim of right for fifteen years, and so
should ripen into a perpetual easement."
Though the implications of the decisions are not entirely
evident, it is probable that the court held the view that the surface was all that was owned, and that the air-space was not subject to more than rights of the nature of easements. It is interesting to note that Justice Baldwin, in an article from which
we have previously quoted, written in the following year, expressed his belief that no ownership such as would support trespass exists in the air-space.
A Michigan case involving a projecting cornice, Wilmarth
v. Woodcock, 12 4 is generally considered to deny ejectment. A
bill in equity to abate the nuisance was allowed specifically on
the ground that the remedies at law, case and trespass (omitting
125
ejectment) would give only inadequate damages.
In a number of cases, the matter of ouster of possession by
"75

Conn. 662, 55 At. 168 (1903).
Mich. 482 (1885). In 1923, Michigan adopted the Uniform State
Aviation Act, which expressly recognizes ownership in superjacent space, and it
will be interesting to see if the doctrine of this case is changed thereby.
'The Scotch law on this subject is stated by Valentine to be: "It is of
course settled that no one can build so as to overhang his neighbor's land
(see e. g., M'Intosh v. Scott & Co., 21 D. 363 (Scot. i859), Hazle v. Turner,
2 D. 886 (Scot. 184o)), but it does not seem quite so clear whether this is
prohibited as a trespass or on the broader ground that it is a nuisance":
Valentine (1910) 22 JURID. RE. 85, 93. Cf. ScHusTR, o. cit. § 326.
258
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a projection has come up for consideration. In California, of
course, we might expect that a projection would not give possession, and the case of Gillespie v. Jones 120 is consistent with such
expectation. There a party claimed adverse possession of land,
and had built a fence around the plot claimed. The owner
built a house which projected over the fence into the lot enclosed.
It was held that the projection was not such a disturbance of the
possession of the builder of the fence as to prevent the running
of the Statute of Limitations in his favor. The case, of course, is
not decisive of the problem under discussion; but it is at least
consistent with the reasoning of the California cases. However,
it may be pointed out that this case arose before the adoption of
the California Code, and would probably be a correct decision no
matter what the view of the court as to the extent of land ownership. If there is ownership of the air-space, all that would result would be that a certain part was carved out of the land, the
title to which was being acquired by adverse possession. If
there is no ownership, there is no possibility of relating this act
to the surface, since there was evidence of possession of the
surface in the existence of the fence. So the case would be decided the same way no matter which of the two views is adopted,
and is not important for our purposes.
In the Massachusetts case of Smith v. Smith, already discussed, Morton, J., remarked: "It is an adverse occupation (to
project eaves) which, if continued for twenty years, will give a
title to the soil by prescription." The evident thought in the
mind of the court was that the possession of the air-space must
be extended to take in possession of the soil beneath. There is,
of course, no necessary implication in this that the air-space is
different from the surface, since an occupation of the same
amount of the surface might have given possession of the airspace. But in the case, later in the same year, of Randall v.
2 7 a situation was presented quite similar to that in
Sanderson,1
the California case of Gillespie v. Jones, just discussed. The projecting eaves and gutter in this case were over a building erected
1"47 Cal.

259 (1874).
= iii Mass. 114 (1872).
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by an adverse occupier of an adjoining lot. To quote from the
decision of Morton, J.:
"The defendants and their grantors have occupied up
to the line claimed by the defendants adversely and exclusively since 1824. This gave them a title to the soil by
prescription after the lapse of twenty years. The fact that
the plaintiff's eaves or gutter projected over the defendant's
line, as stated in the report, would not prevent their acquiring a title by prescription. Their occupation of the soil was
exclusive, adverse and uninterrupted. It was a question of
fact whether the plaintiffs by the projection of their eaves
gained an easement by prescription."
Here apparently all that the court would admit could be
acquired by the continued projections was an easement, not a
title to the space occupied. Of course, this result may be due
not so much to the nature of rights in the air-space, but to an
unwillingness to allow a horizontal division of the land by the
operation of the Statute of Limitations. If a title had been retained by the original owner, it need not, under any view of what
land is, have extended to the surface. The real issue, which is
not necessarily decided by this case, is as to the nature of the
possession evidenced by the projection. If the column is not the
subject of true ownership, but is distinct from and appurtenant
to land, then the one in possession of the surface is in possession
of the principal thing, to which the air-space is subordinate; and
the greatest right which can be acquired by a projection into it
is an easement. This result accords with the case under discussion. But if ownership extends to the air-space column, then two
views are possible:
(i)

The column is incapable of horizontal division; it is
an indivisible thing. In this case, in the event of a dispute as to the possession, either
(a) Possession of the
possession of all.
of the presumption
would be far from
space.

surface is to be considered as
This would be by application
drawn from the maxim; but it
denying ownership of the air-
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(b) The strongest possession (possibly the possession
of the greatest quantum) gives possession of all.
(2)

The column is a divisible thing, i. e., divisible horizontally as well as vertically, since no one disputes the latter division. In this case adverse possession by a projectio'n could give two results:
(a) The projection could be evidence only of possession of only so much space as the projection occupies. This would be by application again of a
presumption derived from the maxim; in other
words, it would give to the possessor of the surface what Terry would call constructive possession of all the space but that actually occupied by
the projection.
(b) The possession evidenced by the projection would
extend to all above, as the possession otherwise
evidenced would extend to all below. This would
be a convenient solution in the possible situation
when there was no possession of the surface of a
strip of land, but two possessions above, one below the other, in the form of projections.128

These possibilities indicate that the decision of the Massachusetts court is not conclusive of a belief that the ownership of
air-space is not permitted by law. Thus, the Massachusetts
court could have adopted the first of the two alternatives suggested, and treated the column of air-space as an indivisible
thing, probably presuming that ownership of the surface or
29
possession of the surface was possession of the whole.1
"Ifne faut retournek l'art. 552 pour" &ablir une pr&omption inverse
d'apr~s laquelle le propri&aire du dessous serait'prsum propri~taire due sol
(7 mai 1838, S. 38. 719, D. 38. I. 223). De m8me le propriftaire du dessus, des
bAtiments qui surplombent le terrain du voisin n'est pas prdsum6 propri&aire de
la portion du sol couverte par la projection verticale des btiments": BAUDRYLACONTIxERIE, DEs BrENs § 331.
'In Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen 364 (Mass. 1863), and Keats v. Hugo, us
Mass. 204 (1874) similar situations arise. In the first the question was left
for the jury to determine whether land below was adversely possessed by projecting eaves. In the second, Gray, C. J., said: "The fact that the eaves and
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In the case of Metropolitan IVest Side Elevated Ry. Co. v.
Springer,130 where an elevated structure projected over land, the
Illinois court held that there was a taking of property which must
be compensated, since the projection was an occupancy of landapparently of the surface and all. This was true despite the undoubted physical power of the landowner to pass beneath the
elevated structure, and otherwise make use of the surface. Here
again we have a case explicable on two grounds: either that
the projection is by some juristic legerdemain related to the soil;
or the projection is evidence of the possession of an indivisible
thing, the land-space. If the first view is adopted, we have difficulty in seeing how the projection is any stronger evidence of
possession than the probable acts of the owner in using the surface beneath the structure, unless we consider that the elevated
company has so interfered with the use of the landowner as to
and no
cornices thereof projected over that line gave them no title to the land
right to prevent the defendant, owning the land, from erecting any building upon
their
it, so long as he did not cut off or interfere with the eaves or cornices of
house".
In Weeks v. Upton, 99 Minn. 410, io9 N. W. 828 (igo6), the court came to
an apparently different conclusion. The opinion states: "The right which respondent acquired in the eighteen inch strip under the eaves was not by an
easement. There are no facts to warrant such a conclusion. On the contrary,
the finding . . . is that the entire strip . . . was in the possession of
respondent and occupied by him for the very purpose of dripping water front
the roof on that side of the barn. . . . The land was thus occupied adversely
to appellant". Accord, semble, Erickson v. Murlin, 39 Wash. 48, 80 Pac. 853
(905).
In Atkins v. Pfaffe, 13o Iowa 728, 114 N. W. 187 (1907), the court said:
"As here the subject of inquiry, occupancy, cannot be understood as limited to
the line of the foundation wall, in view of the facts here shown, it must be held
to include the space covered by the roof cornice, as well as that occupied by the
movement of her window shutters and drains". This is probably the most
positive holding to this effect.
In Baxter v. Girard Trust Co., 288 Pa. 256, 135 Atl. 620 (1927), a wall
leaned over neighboring land. Plaintiff claimed title to the land in a perpendicular line -from the top of the wall up and down, describing it as an
irregular piece of ground "seven-eighths of an inch to three and a half inches
ground line, and three and three-sixteenth inches to six and a half inches at
the top of the building." Plaintiff sought to compel removal of the wall of the
neighbor's building which had been extended over and above the middle of his
wall to the alleged correct lot line. Unfortunately the court did not pass directly
on the interesting questions which arose in this manner, holding that the evidence was not conclusive that the building had leaned for the prescriptive period.
The reasoning of the court, however, justifies the following statement in the
annotation to the case in (927) 49 A. L. R., at 1015: "The court . . . assumes that title to land by adverse possession may be based upon the fact that the
wall of a building belongs to the one claiming . . . leans over the portion
claimed by adverse possession".
(1897).
130 171 Ill. 170, 49 N. E. 416
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be in a position where they cannot refuse the surface on the suit
of the landowner. This view, of course, is entirely possible. So
also is the view that the land, being an indivisible thing, is possessed and appropriated by the one who makes a permanent use
of it no matter whether he touches the surface or not.13 '
3. Wires strung over land. We now come to a group of
cases which deal with the stringing of wires across the soil without touching it or structures upon it.'=
In the important case of Butler v. FrontierTelephone Co.,130
the plaintiff was a private owner in fee simple over whose land
wires were strung without contact with his land or structures
thereon. He brought ejectment. When the case came before
"'In Chicago v. Norton Milling Co., i96 Ill. 58o, 63 N. E. 1043 (1902),
it was held that the city had to acquire the right to swing the end of a bridge
over a portion of land.
'The British Telegraph Act of 1863, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 112, § 21, reads:
"The company shall not place any work by the side of any'land or building
so as to stop, hinder, or interfere with ingress and egress .
. or place
any work under, in, upon, over, along, and across any land or building except
with the previous consent in each case of the owner, lessee, and occupier
of such land or building". The writers of a well-known English textbook
say of this: "The provisions . . . are based upon the assumption that there
is a right of property in the airspace". CLERK AND LINDSELL, LAW OF TORTS
333.
In the United States the rule has been followed that the condemnation
of a right of way for an electric line over private land was a taking of
property only so far as the land occupied by the towers or poles was concerned,
and that only an easement was taken as to the space between the wires. Thus,
the Illinois Supreme Court said, in St. Louis & Cairo R. R. v. Postal Teleg. Co.,
173 Ill. 5o8, 51 N. E. 382 (1898) : "The spaces over which the wires are strung
from pole to pole are not taken by the telegraph company". Accord, Illinois
Teleg. News Co. v. Meine, 242 Ill. 568, 9o N. E. 23o (i9og); Illinois Power &
Light -Corp. v. Talbott, 321 II1. 538, 152 N. E. 486 (1926); Illinois Power &
Light Corp. v. Peterson,

322

Ill. 342, 153 N. E. 577 (1926).

Some of the cases do not even distinguish between the two items of
damage, and treat of the condemnation of a right of way, stating that the damages due the landowner are to be estimated on the basis of the value of the
easement and the depreciation caused the entire property: Alabama Power
Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., i9i Ala. 58, 67 So. 833 (914); Cincinnati Gas
Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 70 W. Va. 157, 73 S. E. 3o6 (1911); Lambeth v. So.
Power Co., 152 N. C. 371, 67 S. E. 921 (igio); Caldwell Power Co. v. Russell,
188 N. C. 725, 125 S. E. 481 (1924). Other cases distinguish between property

actually taken and other damage to a landowner, without specifying just what
was considered to have been "actually taken": Central Ga. Power Co. v. Mays,
137 Ga. 120, 72 S. E. 9oo (1911) ; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Peyton, 124 Ga.
746, 52 S. E. 803 (19o6) ; Kentucky Hydro-Electric Co. v. Woodard, 216 Ky.
618, 287 S. W. 985 (1926).

See, generally, annotation: Elements and measure of compensatiom for
power lines or other wire Unes over private property, (1927) 49 A. L. R. 697.
x86 -N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716 (19o6). See comment on this case, (1go6)
i6 YALE L. J. 275.
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the appellate division of the Supreme Court, 13 4 the cases with
reference to ejectment, which we have previously noted, were
considered, and it was pointed out that, since the question had
never been decisively passed on by the Court of Appeals, it was
still an open one. Ejectment was allowed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.
The following excerpts from the opinion of Vann, J., are
exceptionally important in their bearing on our problem:
"So far as the case before us is concerned, the plaintiff
is the owner of the soil owned upward to an indefinite extent. He owned the space occupied by the wire and had
the right to the exclusive possession of that space which
was not personal property, but a part of his land. According to fundamental principles and within the limitation
mentioned space above land is real estate the same as the
land itself. The law regards the empty space as if it were a
solid, inseparable from the soil, and protects it from hostile
occupation accordingly.
.
"Unless the principle of usque ad coelim is abandoned
any physical, exclusive and permanent occupation of space
above land is an occupation of the land itself and a disseisin of the owner to that extent."
With reference to the problem which had vexed the Appellate
Division in the two earlier cases,'l a the court said:
"Where there is a visible and tangible structure by
which possession is withheld to the extent of the space occupied thereby, ejectment will lie, because there is a disseisin measured by the size of the obstruction, and the sheriff
can physically remove the structure and thereby restore the
owner to possession." 136
lO9 App. Div. 217, 95 N. Y. Supp. 684 (19o5).
Aiken v. Benedict and Vrooman v. Jackson, supra note lO7.
="The chief ground of dissent and of criticism of this case is to be
found in an inability to conceive of the possession of space. Thus a learned
commentator argues: "By possession is meant physical dealing; consequently
there can be no actual possession of anything which is intangible.
An
owner of land cannot physically possess the space above it any more than he
can physically possess an easement or a servitude. . . . A sheriff can no
more deliver such possession of obstructed space by removing the obstruction
as suggested by the present decision than he can give physical possession of an
easement by removing a nuisance which interferes with its enjoyment". The
"*
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This case is an unequivocal commitment to the view that the
land-space above the surface is subject to possession and ownership in the same complete sense that the surface is. Here is no
question of relating the possession of space to the surface in
order to reach the result obtained; here the occupancy of the
space is the occupancy of the land, no matter what occurs on
the surface; the space, for purposes of possession at least, is
divisible horizontally as well as vertically. Only one thing does
the court leave not expressly decided-the possession of the space
above an intruding structure. It seems safe to assume that the
court considers the intruding structure as ousting possession
only of so much of the space as is actually occupiedl1a3
commentator would not dispute the doctrine "that land embraces the space
above and the soil beneath the ground", but believes that the court has here
"unwarrantably extended" it, and that it is "more in accord with reason and
common sense that the owner of the land has a right in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament", or "incidental right!': (19o6) i6 YALE L. J. 275.
Oddly enough, Nash, J., in the appellate division, dissenting on the basis of
Aiken v. Benedict, argued: "'The act of the defendant was a trespass merely,
of which a justice of the peace could take cognizance". If a trespass, it was an
invasion of possession; if so, there was a possession of the space before the
intrusion; if so, possession could be given by the sheriff and ejectment should lie.
The leading English case is Wandsworth District v. United Teleph. Co.,
13 Q. B. D. 904 (1884). The plaintiff, by statute in control of the streets,
sought a mandatory injunction against the stringing of wires across the street
by the defendant company. The adjoining property owners, to whose chimneys
they were attached, had given consent. In an earlier case, Coverdale v. Charlton, 4 Q. B. D. 1o4, (879), the word "street" in the statute which gave authority had been construed to mean more than the surface and to include an
"area of user" below the surface, and it was contended that the rule should be
extended to give a "property" to the "area of ordinary user" above the surface,
and the Court agreed. But the court limited such "property" to the "area of
ordinary user" and held that the wires were above such area. The injunction
was refused on the basis of no trespass. Indicative, however, of the attitude
of the entire court, is this remark of Fry, J.: "As at present advised, I entertain
no doubt that a proprietor of land can cut and remove a wire passed at any
height above his freehold". The case was followed by Finchley Elec. Light Co.
v. Finchley Urban District Council, [9o3] i Ch. 437, and the same result
reached even though the grant of the highway was in form the grant of a fee.
In Graves v. Interstate Power Co., 189 Iowa 227, 178 N. W. 376 (igo),
owing to the, curve of the highway one of defendant's wires extended a few
inches over the fence and above the premises of a landowner. The court said:
"It is not claimed that defendant had a right under its grant to place the wire
upon or across said premises, or that it was placed there with the consent of
the owner. To this extent, defendant was a trespasser." The same court remarked, in Town of Ackley v. Cent. States Elec. Co., 214 N. W. 879, (Iowa
1927), that: "However, from another angle, the city being the owner in fee
simple of the streets, of necessity its rights extend above the surface thereof.
How far we need not determine in this case; but, being entitled to the absolute
control and occupancy of the space above these streets, an invasion thereof,
by stretching wires thereon at this height of necessity is an infraction of the
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4. Intrusion by humans or animals. Under this head, two
interesting cases involving certain points of similarity now require attention.

In Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co.,1 38 the defendant's

horse kicked and bit the plaintiff's mare through a fence separating the land of the defendant from the land of the plaintiff.
Disregarding questions of negligence, it was held that the projection of either the nose or the leg of the defendant's horse into
the space over the plaintiff's land was a trespass for which the
defendant was liable.
In a quarrel between two Iowa ladies, one of them justified
an assault by the trespass of the other. Quoting the court:
"The mere fact that plaintiff did not step across the
boundary line does not make her any less a trespasser if she
reached her arm across the line, as she admits she did. It is
one of the first rules of property known to the law that the
title of the owner of the soil extends, not only downward,
but upward usque ad coelum, although it is, perhaps, doubtrights of the city and amounts to a trespass. Especially must this be true where
the invasion is by wires charged with electrical energy that may be dangerous
to the public". Held, city entitled to a mandatory injunction without showing
of damage.
In Citizen's Teleph. Co. v. C., N. 0. & I. P. R. Co., 192 Ky. 399, 233 S. W.
goi (I92i), wires were strung across the railroad's right of way. We find this
judicial comment: "If it (the railroad) owns the fee, it has the exclusive right
of occupancy of the right of way indefinitely upward, and can enjoin the stringing of wires or the erection of any structure whatsoever over the same". It was
held, however, that the railroad had only an easement, which was not actually
obstructed and recovery was denied.
Comments of the Georgia Court of Appeal on a similar situation reveals
a very definite commitment to the view that space above the surfacc is subject
to ownership. "While it is true that a railway company may by deed from
the owner acquire a fee simple title to the land transversed by its tracks, and
such an absolute ownership of the soil will extend indefinitely upward so as to
include the proprietorship of the air and space above such land, yet when it
has. acquired by condemnation .
it gets only what is termed a 'right
of way'

".

Planiol gives us a citation to a French case (Trib. de paix de Lille, 15 Nov.
1899, D. 1900 s. 361) where the court ordered an electric company to remove
wires passing over private property: PLANIOt., TRAITt ]ILPMENTAIRE § 2329, p.
723. Statutory authority was afterwards granted to electric companies (loi du
I juin 19o6). The German law appears to have the same rule: SCHUSTER,
PRINCIPLES 386.

" L. R. (1874) io C. P. 19. Per Coleridge, C. J.: "I cannot say I entertain
any doubt. . . . It seems to me sufficiently clear that some portion of the
defendant's horse's body must have been over the boundary. That may be a
very small trespass, but it is a trespass at law".
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ful whether owners as quarrelsome as the parties in this
case will ever enjoy the usufruct of their property in the
latter direction." iS
The rule is apparently as yet uncontradicted.
5. Intrusion by projectiles. The interference with the airspace by shooting across the land, none of the shots touching
the surface or structures thereon, was one of the problems first
stated by Lord Ellenborough in his celebrated dictum in Pickering v. Rudd: 140
"I do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the
column of air superincumbent on the close. I once had occasion to rule upon the circuit that a man who, from the
outside of a field, discharged a gun into it, so that the
shot must have struck the soil, was guilty of breaking and
entering it. . . . But I am by no means prepared to
say that firing across a field in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it, amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this
board overhanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it
would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass at the suit of the occupier of every field over which the
balloon passes in the. course of his voyage."
Fifty years later the case of Kenyon v. Hart 141 arose out of a
statute governing a particular series of acts, trespass in search
of game, and thus the case is not directly in point. But in the
course of argument, the case of Regina v.Pratt142 was cited,
and Justice Blackburn remarked:
I-annibalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, go N. W. 93 (i9o2). The VirH
ginia court, in Lynchburg Teleph. Co. v. Booker, 1O3 Va. 595, 50 S. E. 148
(igo5), discussing a defense of contributory negligence set up by the telephone company, took a different attitude: "In legal contemplation it may be
that any unauthorized entry upon the premises of another whose title extends to the center of the earth downward and without limit upward. by putting
one's hand through or over a boundary fence, is a trespass.' It would, however,
certainly seem that the trespass had reached its vanishing point when such a
trespass was committed by a child eight years of age. The owner of the
premises would find it difficult to maintain such a defense if he had knowingly
permitted so grievous a danger to exist within reach of a public street, and
thereby caused an injury to one incapable of contributory negligence".
404 Camp. 219 (1815).
1416 B. & S. 247 (1865).

10 4

E. & B. 86o (1855).

The case is not otherwise relevant.
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"That case raises the old query of Lord Ellenborough
as to a man passing over the land of another in a balloon;
he doubted whether an action of trespass would lie for it. I
understand the good sense of that doubt, though not the
legal reason for it." 143
The implications of Lord Ellenborough's remarks are undoubtedly to deny ownership in the air-space. Remarks in the
WJandsworth case, previously discussed, led to a belief that the
view of Justice Blackburn rather than that of Lord Ellenborough
prevailed in England. However, a case .arose in the first part
of the century which seemed rather to support Pickering v. Rudd.
In Clifton v. Bury,1 4 4 Hawkins, J., reasoned as follows:
"As regards the complaint that when the thousand
yards range was used the bullets traversed the land of the
plaintiff, I do not look upon the ground of complaint as constituting a trespass in the strict technical sense of the term;
but I do look upon such firing of bullets as a grievance
which, under the circumstances, afforded the plaintiff a legal
course of action."
145
Thus the recovery is placed upon the ground of nuisance.
The few American cases seem to reach an opposite result.
In Whittaker v. Stangvick 146 a perpetual injunction was granted
against shooting across land, despite no appreciable damage being
proved; since, according to Justice Jaggard, "in trespass quare
clausurn fregit it is immaterial whether the quantum of harm suffered be great, little, or unappreciable." In the comparatively re-

"nNevertheless we find a dictum in an Indian case a few years later, as
follows: "No man has any absolute property in the open space above his land.
To interfere with the column of air superincumbent upon such land is not a
trespass. Lord Ellenborough justly ridiculed the notion that travellers in a
balloon could be deemed trespassers on the property of those over whose land
the balloon might pass": per Norman, J., in Bagram v. Karformak, (1869) 3
Bengal L. Rep. 18.
1"4 Times L. R. 8 (1887).
" Kuhn says: "A careful reading of the opinion will show that the gravamen of the action was the actual interference with the enjoyment of the soil":
Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aerial Law, (91o) 4 Ams. J. INT. LAW lO9, at 125.
2, IOO Minn. 386, III N. W. 295 (19o7).
There was possibly an actual contact with the soil here, because of falling birds.
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cent case of Herrin v. Sutherland 147 trespass was allowed, and
the case is unequivocable.

It is interesting to note that the Butler

case is cited with approval.
The United States Supreme Court expressed an attitude on
the matter in the case of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel
Company v. United States.148 A suit had been instituted in the
Court of Claims on the implied contract alleged to have been

made by the taking of property of the plaintiff, which taking of
property was by the establishment of a battery which had fired
and would fire over the plaintiff's land. While the court was divided on the matter of the recovery, the dissenting justices did
not question Mr. Justice Holmes' characterization of the shooting
as a "trespass."
6. Trespass by airplane. The discussion over the liability

of the aeronaut in trespass, which, beginning with the century,
has been carried on vigorously until the last few years, is rapidly
becoming more and more academic, apparently without ever having been passed on by a court in the Anglo-American system of

law. Two cases in lower courts have disposed of situations in
which the problem was pretty clearly presented, and both of them
apparently have denied that the flight of aircraft over land violates the owner's possession. 1 49 The cases are interesting chiefly

as indicating the probable judicial attitude toward the matter.
"174 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925). See note in (1926) 42 A. L. R. 945.
See note to this case, (1923) 23 CoL L. REv. 402,
1"260 U. S. 327 (1922).
entitled: Trespass-Entry Above Surface.
"In Commonwealth v. Nevin,

2

D. & C. 241 (Pa. 1922), an appeal was

taken from a summary conviction of an aeronaut under a penal statute covering
trespasses to unoccupied lands. The lower court was reversed because the requirements of the statute were not met by the facts of the case. The court,
in passing, unburdened itself as follows:
"'Wilfully to enter upon land', as used in the act, indicates an encroachment
on or interference with the owner's occupation of his soil; but is not synonymous
with the flight through the air over it, which has yet, so far as we are aware,
to be held an entry upon it, and a meaning of the term not heretofore attributed
to it!" See comment (1922) 71 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 88; (1923) 3 DocKT 20.
The Docket, (1923) v. 3, p. 23, prints an opinion of Michael, J., in a
Minnesota district court denying an injunction against any flying over certain
premises in a city, flight over which at less than 2ooo feet was prohibited by
statute. The court, denying relief, argued:
"Common law rules are sufficiently flexible to adapt themselves to new
conditions arising out of modern progress.

.

.

. The air, so far as it has

any direct relation to the comfort alid enjoyment of the land, is appurtenant
to the land and no less the subject of protection than the land itself; but when,
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The question has been rendered entirely academic in England by the British Air Navigation Act of 1920,150 which became
effective on December 23d of that year. Section 9, paragraph i
of the Act provides:
"No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect
of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft over
any property at a height above the ground, which, having regard to wind, weather, and all the circumstances of the case,
is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of such flight, so
long as the provisions of this Act and any Order made there.
are duly complied with; but where mateunder .
rial damage or loss is caused by an aircraft . . . to

any person or property on land or water, damages shall be
recoverable from the owner of such aircraft
without proof of negligence or intention or other cause of
action."
The effect of this act is to take away the remedy of trespass, if it existed before, and to require proof of actual damage,
the normal rule in trespass on the case. Proof of negligence is
not required, however, and absolute liability for actual damage
is imposed. Presumably not even the defense of an act of God
would be allowed; this resembles, and in some ways is stricter,
than the old common law requirements for trespass. This absoas here, the air is to be considered at an altitude of two thousand feet or more,
to contend that it is a part of the realty as affecting the right of air navigation
instantaneous constructive trespasses. Modern progress and great public interest
is only a legal fiction devoid of substantial merit. Under the most technical
application of the rule, flight at such an altitude can amount to no more than
should not be blocked by unnecessary legal refinements.

.

.

.

Failure to

sustaint the plaintiff's contention relative to upper air trespasses does not deprive
him of any substantial rights or militate against his appropriate and adequate
remedies for recovery of damages and injunctive relief in cases of actual
trespasses or the commission of a nusance; hence the scope of the temporary
injunction has been limited to enforced compliance with the Minnesota law
already mentioned".
It has been held that neither an aeroplane nor a hydro-aeroplane is within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: The Crawford Bros. No. 2,
215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 1914); New York v. Smith, 119 Misc. 294 (1922).
See note, (1914) 28 HARV. L. REV. 2OO. But a hydro-aeroplane while in the
water is within admiralty jurisdiction: Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service
Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371 (I92I), noted in (1922) 18 A. L. R. 1324.
A moot court decision, reported in (1912) 19 CASE & COMIENT 681, held
an airship a trespasser.
"' (ig2o) IO & ii Geo. V., c. 8o.

THE VERTICAL EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP IN LAND

679

lute liability prevents us from terming the right of passage an
eascient.15
This Act is clearly dictated by common sense and the necessities of modem life; but it does not in any way decide our question. As has been frequently suggested, the Common Law would
probably have worked out a solution on the basis of easement,
servitude, or license, without other derogation of the Hghts of
ownership in the air-space.
Section 3 of the Uniform State Aviation Act, entitled "Ownership of Space," reads as follows:
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters
of the state is declared to be vested in the several owners of
the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described
in Section 4."
Section 4 provides:
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this
state is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to interfere
with the existing use to which the land or water or the space
over the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so
conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or
property lawfully on the 'land or water beneath."
Professor Bogert writes of these provisions as follows:
"These sections are believed to state the Common Law
as expressed in the Latin maxim cuius est solum . . .
etc.. The land owner is believed to own the space above his
surface as real property insofar as he can and does make
effectual use of it." 152
"'A comment on the first case arising under this act, Roedean School v.
Cornwall Aviation Co., may be found in (1926) 99 CENT. L. J. 3ii, quoting
from (1926) 70 SoCITOR'S JOURNAL 785.
Bogert, Recent Developments in the Law of Aeronautics, (1922) 8 CoRN.
L. Q. 26. Speaking of § 4, he continues: "This section declares an easement of
harmless flight which is believed to have an analogy in the easement of navigation which the Common Law gives over navigable streams, theF beds of which
are privately owned. If this easement does not exist, the development of
aeronautics is impossible and flight over the lands of another is a trespasstwo conclusions which seem neither reasonable nor desirable".
It should be recognized frankly that such a result as this doctrine of a
naturaleasement is at best a more or less awkward concession to necessity. As a
commentator in the Harvard Law Review remarks: "Although the flight of an
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This Uniform Aviation Act has been adopted by the Territory
of Hawaii and the following eleven states: Delaware, Idaho,
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and Vermont. 153 Earlier statutes of
Connecticut and Massachusetts, passed in 1911 and 1913 re-

1 54
spectively, arrive at a similar result by implication.
Section io of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 155 provides as
follows:
"As used in this Act, the term 'navigable airspace'
means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under Section 3,
and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right
of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act."

Under the regulatory powers given the Secretary of Commerce by Section 3, the Department of Commerce has issued
the Air Commerce Regulations, effective December 31, 1926.
Section 8i of these regulations establishes five hundred feet as
the minimum height, except over cities, towns, or congested areas,
where it is raised to one thousand feet.
This Act applies to a large bulk of the regular commercial
aviation of the country, although it does not, of course, reach
airplane will very likely not be held a tort, the common law seems to afford
no basis for holding the aviator liable only for negligence": note, Trespass by
Airplane, (1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 569.
= 9 UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED.
Supplement (1927) 26. All but South
Dakota adopted it in 1923.
" CONN. LAWS (1911) c. 86, § ii: "Every aeronaut shall be responsible
for all damages suffered in this state by any person from injuries caused by
any voyage in an airship directed by such aeronaut . . . ". MAss. STAT.
(1913) c. 666, § 6: "When flying over buildings, persons, or animals, an
aviator shall fly at such altitude as will best conduce to the safety of those
below him as well as to the safety of himself and his passengers.

.

.

. He

shall be held liable for injuries resulting from his flying unless he can demonstrate that he had taken every reasonable precaution to prevent such injury".
Both of these provisions by implication authorize flight, and establish a rule
similar to nuisance, although the Connecticut statute may impose an absolute
liability. Connecticut is one of the states which seem to refuse to recognize
a proprietary right above the surface and thus it would not need to bother
with easements or other explanations.
A number of other states have passed laws partially covering the field of
aviation. Cf. Bogert, Problems of Aviation Lazw (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 271,
for a discussion of some of these to the date of the Uniform State Aviation Law.
"'44 STAT. 568 (1926), U. S. C. (Supp. 1927) TIT. 49, §§ 171-184.
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the stunt flyer in his local exhibifions, who is still subject to the
local State law. There is no rule as to liability expressly dictated, and the matter is apparently left to the courts. This Act,
taken in conjunction with the legislation in the States, indicates
the inevitable trend of the law on this subject.i
Two French cases, in 1912 and 1914, interpreted the Code
Civil provisions to produce a result analogous to the English
nuisance rule. 15 7 The difference in forms of action, and the dif-

ferent significance attached to recovery, renders it impossible to
draw any conclusions from these cases as to the extent of ownership really allowed by the French courts. 158
See note i6o, post.
'Bertrand, Brinquant, Mauge, c. Ste. Farman, Gazette du Palais du 6
Juillet 1912; also reported in (1912) 3 Revue Juridique Internationale de la
Locomotion Airrienne, 282; Huertebrise v. Esnault Pelterie, Farman, et Borel
(Tribunal Civil de Paris), noted in (914) 48 Am. L. RIEv. 914, and HOLLAND,
JURISPRUDENCE 19InM
See note of cases, LYCKIAmA, pp. 41-42.
From the syllabus in the first case: "It en est ainsi, par exemple, lorsque
plusieurs propriftaires prtendent qu'en 6voluant au-dessus de leurs terres
des aroplanes troublent la libre jouissance de leurs biens, soit, d'une part,
par la frayeur caus~e aux animaux, les atterrissages frequents qui endommagent
les rcoltes, I'affluence des curieux qui envahissent les cultures ou le drangement
caus6 aux travailleurs des champs qui sont A leur service, soit, d'autre part,
par le d~peuplement du gibier qu'6ffraient les apparitions bruyantes des appareils.
"La menace d'un prejudice 6ventual n'est une cause l~gitime d'action
qu'autant qu'elle constitue par elle-mme un trouble actuel dans la possession
ou dans la jouissance.
"II nrappartient donc pas aux tribunaux de pr~juger des faits qui ne leur
sont pas soumis, de fixer la hauteur A laquelle des aviateurs d6pront s'6lever,
ou les appareils silencieux, dont les aroplanes doivent Etre munis".
The "affluence des curieux qui envahissent les cultures" suggests the case
of Guille v. Swan, i Johns. 381 (N. Y. 1822). The case really amounts to
a refusal of an injunction against future trespasses, and the requirement of
proof of actual damage. This is the case noted in (1913) 24 JuRiD. REv. 321,
and (1912) IS VA. L. REG. 384.
The second case limited the right of the proprietor to the height usable by
him, for building or their accessories or the products of cultivated land, granting
freedom for circidation airrienne above that height; but it allowed recovery
in the case-before it because of the insufficient altitude at which the flights
complained of were taking place.
'The
natural interpretation of the majority of foreign codes or enactments would lead to a belief in their recognition of ownership of the air-space:
Art. 552 of the Code Civil of France (Code Napol~on): "La propri~t6
du sol emporte la propri6t6 du dessus et du dessous
. ." (Riviere, Codes
Francais). The same provision, verbatim, constitutes § 552 of the Belgian
Code (DE LE COURT CODES BEtGES, 2oe. ed.); art. 626 of the Code of the
Netherlands (Tn, Es, LES CODES NEEMANDAIS) ; and § 1446 of the (Code Civil
Monaco). In discussing this provision, as inferring the ownership of the
air-space, Bonnefoy remarks: "Jusqu'ici la grande majorit6 des auteurs et la
Jurisprudence presque unanime des Cours et Tribunaux estimaient que ce
droit 6tait sans limite et absolu": BoxNE:FoYr, LE CODE DE L'Ai 121.
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Roughly to summarize:
(a) California, owing to statutory commitment, apparently
does not recognize ownership above the surface.
(b) Michigan and Connecticut, by their refusal to allow
ejectment, apparently also deny ownership.of the airspace.
(c) The remainder of the cases in the courts of the United
States seem to recognize ownership in the air-space; 159
but are influenced by the presumptions which arise from
Art. 9o5 of the German Civil Code (B. G. B.) : "The right of the owner
of a piece of land extends to the space above the surface and to the earth under
the surface. However, the owner cannot prohibit interferences which take place
at such height or depth that he has no interest in their exclusion" (Loewy's tr.).
This has been likened by some to Pollock's effective possession doctrine.
Art. 667 of the Swiss Civil Code provides as follows: "The ownership of
the soil implies the ownership of all that is above and below the surface to
such a height and depth respectively as the owner may require. It extends,
subject to certain legal restrictions, to all buildings on the ground as well as
plants and springs in it" (Williams's tr.).

Art. 526 of the Civil Code of Brazil "The ownership of the soil embraces

whatever is above and below it to whatever height or depth and which is useful
to its exercise; the owner cannot, however, prevent works which may be
undertaken at such a height or depth that he has no interest in preventing them"

(Wheeless's tr.).
Art. 44o of the Italian Code: "Chi ha la pur quella dello spazio sourastante
edi tutto cio che si trova sopra e sotto la superficie": (TREVES, CODIcI D'ITAUA).
Art. 2o7 of the Civil Code of Japan: "The ownership of land, within the
restrictions of laws and ordinances, extends above and under the surface" (J.
E. DF BECKER, ANNOTATED CrvIL CODE 1909).

Art. 350 of the Spanish Civil Code: "The owner of a parcel of ground
is owner of its surface and everything under it, and he can make thereon any
works, plantations, and excavations which may be convenient for him, without
injury to the easements and subject to what is prescribed by the laws about
mines and waters and by Police Regulations" WALTON, CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN
AND SPANISH AmERICA (igoo).
This provision, it will be noted, says nothing
of superjacent space.

Professor Bogert remarks generally concerning foreign codes: "None

• .

.

require the condemnation of an aerial right of way, and none provide

that the mere flight through the space above shall constitute a trespass": Bogert,
Problems in Aviation Law (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 27, at 298.
For those countries which have signed the International Flying Convention
adopted by the Peace Conference, a right of innocent passage seems to have
been granted to foreign aircraft, unobstructed by rights of private landowners.
it is highly improbable that the right would be recognized by treaty and given to
foreign ships, and denied to the citizens of the treaty state.
' Kuhn apparently would not deduce ownership from our decisions:
"Later' decisions in England and in this country found no difficulty in justifying
the action of trespass in all cases of encroaching signs, buildings, trees over-

hanging, wires, and the like where the attachment to the soil was upon de-

fendant's land, though not entirely clear of the complainant's. . . . But
this is wholly independent of any recognition of property rights in the airspace":
Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aerial Law, (1910) 4 Amt. J. INT. LAW 109, at
124. The reason for this conclusion does not appear.
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the application of the maxim usque ad coclum, sometimes to attach most importance to possession of the surface in cases where there is a conflict of possession. It
would seem especially clear that ownership in the airspace is recognized in New York since the Butler case.
(d) In England the tendency is Iapparently toward recognition of such ownership, with the one exception of the
case of Clifton v. Bury.
(e) The tendency of opinion in the profession, and the
tendency of legislation, is toward the recognition of an
easement or other right of passage for the aeronaut,
basing his liability either on actual damage (absolute
1 60
liability), or on damage caused by negligence.
Zollman also draws a distinction between projections which are themselves appurtenant or attached to neighboring land, and other intrusions: Zollman, Air Space Rights, (1915)

53 Ams. L. REV. 711, at 724. There seems no

logical basis for the distinction, since that into which the intrusion projects
remains the same, and an airplane might trespass at a lower height than a
tall building.
Bogert, when writing before the formulation of the Uniform State Aviation Act, remarked: "All the decisions are regarding intrusions into the space
very near the surface, where the actual use of the soil by the surface occupant
was disturbed": Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 271.
It is probably true that we do not have definite disproof of the "zone theories".
" "The tendency of discussion is towards a modification of the common
law doctrine of the landowner's exclusive right and control of the air space
above, by the recognition of a fight of passage at such a distance above the
land as to involve no interference with the fullest utilization of the land itself":
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 251, p. 864.
A partial list of the more important of the numerous law review and
periodical articles on this subject which have not previously been cited follows:
Baldwin, The Law of the Airship (904) 4 Am. J. INT. LAW 95; Biggar, The
Law Relating to the Air, (1921) 41 CAN. LAW TIMES 667 (would recognize
only interference with user) ; Bogert, Problems of Aviation Law (1921) 6 CORN.
L. Q. 271; Davis, Putting Laws over Wings, (1925) II A. B. A. J. 529;
Hackett, Rights in Air Space and Lord Ellenborough's Dictum, (1924) IO
VA L. REv. 312; Hazeltine, The Law of Civil Aerial Trausport, (1919)
JouR. CoM. LEG. & INT. LAW 3rd series, v. I, pt. I, p. 76; Mackenzie, Aerial
Navigation and the Law which should govern it (1911) 47 CAN. L. J. 2o6;
Marshall, Some Legal Problems of the Aeronaut, (1923) 6 ILL. L. Q. 5o;
McCracken, Air Law (1923) 57 Am. L. REv. 97; Meyer, Trespass by Aeroplane,
(igo) 36 LAW MAG. & REV. 17; Meyer, Aviation and Future Legislation,
(1911) 36 LAW MAG. & REV. 176; Moore, Aerial Navigation, (igoS) 12 LAW
NOTES 108 (Suggests giving admiralty jurisdiction) ; Myers, The Air and the
Earth Beneath, (1914) 26 GREEN BAG 363 (also believes that eminent domain
proceedings would be advisable); Myers, The Sovereignty of the Air, (1912)
24 ibid. 229 (points out fallacy of high seas analogy); Myers, The Freedom
of the Air, ibid. 430; Myers, The practical Solution of the Problem of Sovereignty in Aerial Law, (1914) 26 ibid. 57 (favors complete sovereignty);
Platt, The Airship-A Trespasser, (91o) 7 OH. L. REP. 402 (suggests eminent
domain solution) ; Rich, Federal Control over Air Navigation, (igio) 17 CASE
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V.

EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP IN SUBJACENT SPACE

Looking at the other side of the surface, we have greater
difficulty in understanding just what is meant by the cases. Here
we find three possible views of the extent of ownership:
I. Ownership is of the solid matter below the surface.

Ownership is of the surface, to which are added certain
appurtenant rights respecting the solid matter or space
beneath.
3. Ownership extends to the column of space beneath the
surface which is occupied by solid matter, but which is
2.

distinct from that solid matter, as well as to the solid mat-

ter.
The presumption usque ad inferos is nearly universally applied as far as the solid matter under the surface is affected. 161
& CoM. 258; Sperl, The Legal Side of Aviation, (tr., Weatherford) (I9ii) 23
GREEN BAG 398 (advocates absolute national sovereignty) ; Spurr, Let the Air
Remain Free, (1911) 18 CASE & CoM. 119 (makes distinction between air and
space; criticizes the Butler case) ; Swift, Present and Proposed Aerial Legislation, (1911) 18 CASE & CoM. 134, 14 CAN. L. J. 5o2; Valentine, The AirA Realm of Law, (191o) 22 JURID. REV. 85; Zollman, Governmental Control
of Aircraft, (919) 53 Am.L. REv. 897; Zollman, Air Space Rights, ibid. 711;
Webb, Can I Fly Over Your Land?, (192o) 48 WASH. L. REs. 673; Williams,
The Law of the Air, (1911) 18 CASE & CoMe. 131; Wilson, Aerial Jurisdiction,
5 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 171 (favors complete state sovereignty); Aviation and
Wireless Telegraphy as Respects the Maxims and Principles of the Common
Law, (igio) 46 CAN. L. J.480 (advocates "preferential use" doctrine).
In addition to Hazeltine's book and the chapter in Davids supra.note 18, cf.
SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN PEACE AND THE LAW (igg), which contains an exhaustive bibliography to its date; and FIXFL, THE LAW OF AVIATION (1927).
The last named book is a somewhat hastily compiled reference work, citing
a considerable mass of statutes and authors. Although it speaks of both the
air and the air-space, it makes no distinction between them. The chief criticism to be directed toward it, however, is a somewhat astonishing belief that the
national Air Commerce Act of 1926 was an attempt to regulate all air
navigation, superseding the legislation of the individual states. Thus, on p.
67, it speaks of an ordinance of the city of Chicago being voided by the
passage of the act. The assumption that the federal government had the
power, to legislate on all aerial navigation is based, apparently, on the argument implicit from the following passage: "Since it has been well established
that sovereignty in air-space is vested in the state or in the nation, the question
whether a trespass is committed by flying over another's land is to a certain
extent obsolete"!
On the particular problem of the liability of aeronauts for injuries resulting from the operation of their planes, see: Zollman, Liability of an Aircraft,
(1919) 53 Am. L. REV. 576; Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation, (igio) 9 MICH. L. REV. 20 (advocates absolute liability).
'
"The owner of the surface of the land is prima facie the owner of the
soil or mineral objects to the center of the earth, and any underground en-

THE VERTICAL EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP IN LAND

685

It is universally conceded that trespass lies for entering below
the surface. 16 2 This, of course, is usually because such a trespass involves disturbance of the solid matter of the soil, which
is often mentioned as part of the basis for such action. 16 z On
the Continent, regalian rights, in minerals sometimes interfere
with the presumption, but England never recognized them except
in mines of gold and silver.164 For our purpose, cases are recroachment by an adjoining owner is a trespass or nuisance": TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, § 252, p. 865.
Trespass by interference with minerals has been frequently upheld: Maye
v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306 (1863); United States v. Magoon, 3 McLean 17,
Fed. Cas. No. 15707 (1848); Morgan v. Powell, 2 G. & D. 721 (1842). On
the general proposition of trespass for entry below the surface: POLLOCK.
TORTS p. 35; SALMOND, TORTS § 52, p. 176 (who adds, without citing authority:
"Where the possession of the surface has been separated from that of the
subsoil . . . any infringement of the horizontal boundary thus created is
a trespass"). JAGGARD, TORTS, p. 66I. A life tenant has an estate in "all the
land", and so the owner of the inheritance cannot trespass by a tunnel: Koen
v. Bartlett 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E. 664 (895).
1 Cf. Ashton v. Stock, 6 Ch. D. 726 (877)
(working of mines under
another's land from mines under trespasser's land) ; Lewis v. Branthwaite, 2 B.
& Ad. i86 (183) (the tenant in possession of copyhold lands may maintain
trespass against the owner of an adjoining colliery for taking coal, although
no trespass committed on the surface). In the latter case Lord Tenterden
remarked: "He who has the surface has the subsoil, and it seems to me that
the copyholder has possession of the subsoil although he may have no property in it".
' Cf. Snyder, Severence of Estates in Mines and Some of the Consequences, (i9o9) 68 CENT. L. 3. 283. A discussion of the implications of the presumption is to be found in MIRAGLIA, op. cit. § 290, p. 472, et seq. Among the
points there discussed is the postulate of possession of minerals by the surface
owner who is not aware of them.
PA IOL, TRAITE
.Lt.1ENTAIRE
§ 2391, p. 745: "Th6oriquement son droit
s'6tend indefiniment en profondeur. Tous les gisements m6talliques ou autres,
situes au-dessous de la parcelle, lui appartiennent 6galement, A quelque profondeur qu'ils se trouvent. Tel est le principe traditionnel du droit franqais".
However, French mining law, especially since the legislation of i8io, attempts
in a fashion to separate the soil from the minerals, allowing parties not owners
of the surface to exploit the mines, upon payment of compensation to the
surface owner. See, generally, on this phase of French law, BAUDRY-LACONTINERIE, DES BIaNS §§ 333, 334; DEMOLOMBE, DISTINCTION DES BIENS 567-573.
In another passage Planiol remarks: "Si la lettre du Code a t6 respect6e,
son esprit a 6t6 mconnu, car le r~sultat reel de la loi de i8io a 6t6 de faire
de ]a mine une propri6t6 distincte de la surface et qui n'est plus A la disposition
des propri~taires foncires": PLANIOL, TRAIT. ]ILtMENTAIRE § 2394, P. 746.
This exception to the -usual presumption extends only to the exploitation of the
mineral substances alone, and the payment of the compensation to the surface
owner (redevance) is in itself a recognition of the surface owner's interest.
Demolombe considers that, "il faut donc, en effet, d6clarer aujourd'hui avec
notre art. 552, que la propriit6 du sol emporte la propri~t6 du dessous sans
restriction et sans limite, du dessous a toute profondeur, du dessous usque
ad infera": DEMOLOMBE, DISTINCTION DES BIENs 564.
German law gives the right to strangers to win the minerals, under certain restrictions: SCHUSTER, Op. cit., § 350, PP. 413, 414.
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quired dealing with the space occupied by the solid matter. We
may expect to find few in which the space has had sufficient importance apart from the matter occupying it to receive separate
consideration.
The Wisconsin ejectment cases, beginning with McCourt v.
Eckstein, have already been discussed, and we saw that no distinction was there made between projections above and below
the surface, and that apparently ownership of the superjacent
and subjacent space was allowed, subject to a presumption as
to possession in favor of the surface, and apparently a juristic
quality of indivisibility.
Another case of a projecting foundation wall is that of
Wachstein v. Christopher,16 5 where Cobb, P.,J., remarked: "The
mere fact that the thing sought to be recovered is below the surface is no reason why ejectment is not the appropriate remedy."
Contrary in result, and apparently in accord with the other
Michigan case of Wilmarth z. Woodcock, previously discussed,
is the case of Harringtonv. City of Port Huron.166 Here there
was ejectment brought against the city for maintaining a sewer
under the plaintiff's land, and the judgment of the court below
on the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff described the land by
the surface measurements only. The upper court apparently
considered that the sewer constituted only an easement, and so
could not be delivered by the sheriff under the writ of possession. A statement of the court to the effect that ejectment will
not lie for "a mere trespass" indicates that perhaps the court
considered the operation of the sewer a violation of an ownership
right.
In the interesting case of City of Chicago v. Troy Laundry, 67 the defendant city constructed a tunnel fifty-five feet below the surface without the knowledge of the plaintiff. Sixteen
years later the plaintiff erected a building, and then discovered
the tunnel, which caused a sinking of the building then constructed. It was held, not only that the construction of the tun128

Ga.

229,

57 S. E. 51, (i9o7),

ii L. R. A. (N. s.) 917, and note.

86 Mich. 46, 48 N. W. 641 (1891). We have already noted the difficulties
of ejectment when applied to projections beneath the surface.
162 Fed. 678 (C. C. A. 7th, i9og).
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nel was a trespass, but that the forcing of water through it constituted a continuing trespass.
In Smith v. City of Atlanta,'88 the building of a sewer
through a private lot was held to be a taking of the property of
the plaintiff, although the defendant city proved that the market
value of the surface was unaffected. As illustrating the reasoning of the court, the following excerpt from the opinion of Justice Lumpkin has significance here:
"All the earth removed belonged to the plaintiffs and
unquestionably by the location of the sewer they were deprived of the possession of the space it occupied, and could
no longer use that space for any other purpose."
The court here distinguished two things which were owned
by the plaintiff: the earth, which had been removed; and the
space which it occupied. Although the emphasis is on the use
of the space, that is to illustrate that the property in it had been
taken. The probable meaning of the court is that the space was
the subject of possessory and proprietary rights, for which compensation must be given without reference to the value of the
surface.
In an English case, Phillips v. Homfray,0 9 it was held that
a party who took coals from another's land without the landowner knowing must not only pay for the coals, but must also
give compensation for the use of the wayleave made by the removal of the coals. Of course, in both this case and the Troy
Laundry case, a physical contact with the soil was involved in
the use of the space; nevertheless, it was the space which was
primarily used.
The case of Costigan v. Pennsylvania Ry., 7 0 presents a
'a 92 Ga. i1g, 17 S. E. 981 (1893).

'OL. ML Ch. App. 770 (1871).
17054 N. J. L. 233, 23 Ati. 8io (1892). Note to this case, (1892) 6 HARV.
L. REv. ioo: "To say that a man cannot put a building of the size he chooses on
his own land is at first a startling doctrine; but if the plaintiff can prove actual
transfer of particles of earth from his neighbor's lot to his, however far below
the surface, it seems to follow necessarily that there is a trespass. . . . It is
needless to add that the unmetaphysical sympathies of juries as well as the
infrequency of violent subterranean displacements, will keep this scientific
principle within due limits".
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somewhat unusual situation. The plaintiff in that case was the
owner of a lot, with dwellings thereon, contiguous to a strip of
land owned by the defendant railroad company. The defendant
company constructed a high embankment for a roadbed, the
weight of which, according to the declaration in the case, "forced
a large quantity of earth into and upon plaintiff's lot below the
surface" and thus caused injury to the foundation and walls of
the dwelling houses on the lot. The declaration was held to set
out a good cause of action in trespass. This case is explicable
on two grounds; first, that the trespass was the forcing of the
earth or solid matter into the plaintiff's lot; or, secondly, that it
was the disturbance of the surface. The latter is the explanation
which would be given by those who, like Dean Wigmore, hold
that the surface is the sole subject of ownership.
The Master of the Rolls, in Mitchell v. Mosely,17 1 discussed
a conveyance which followed a mining lease, but in which no
exception or reservation was expressed, in the following manner:
"The grant of the land includes the surface and all that
is supra, houses, trees, and the like . . . (citing the
maxim); and all that is infra, i. e., mines, earth, clay, etc.
It is, however, within the right of the lessees to get the coal
and cannel during the term. Subject to that right, so far
as it can be and is exercised by the lessees under the lease, it
is to my mind quite clear as a matter of construction of the
conveyances that not merely the surface rights but the whole
substratum to the centre of the earth, even including the
vacant spaces from which during the term the coal may have

been worked out by the lessees-all that passed.

.

.

.172

An analogous case is that of Roushlange v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 115 Ind.
io6, 17 N. E. I98 (1888). Here there was an upheaval of the surface of the
adjoining land caused by a fill in a marshy place; but the following part of
the opinion would indicate that the court considered the injury to be the use
of the adjoining land under the surface: "The fact remains that appellant
granted to the railway company a strip of land upon which to construct and
operate its road, and it has so constructed it as to make it rest, not only upon
the strip thus granted, but also upon his adjoining land not granted. The railway company is thus occupying land which was not granted to it, and
which neither party intended should be either granted to it or occupied by its
road. The road is no less an encroachment upon appellant's land because its
foundation is beneath the surface".
" [1914] 1 Ch. 438.
"2 Per Cozens-Hardy, M. R.
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The effect or significance of these remarks cannot be made
apparent without a discussion of a group of cases quite involved
in nature-where the surface has been separated in ownership
from either the mines or the minerals beneath. It is believed that
73
can
several of these cases, as for example Bowser v. Maclean,1
be explained on no other ground than that the law recognizes
1 74
ownership of the space below the surface.
Disregarding these cases at this time, it nevertheless appears consistent with this preliminary examination to consider
the space lying beneath the surface as something which can be
owned, and is owned, subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by our modes of life, and, perhaps, as is suggested by the
Wisconsin cases, subject to certain presumptions arising out of
acts at the surface. At least, we may accept this as a working
hypothesis.
=Th2 De G. F. & J. 415 (Eng. I86o).

"'Division of land ownership horizontally, both above and beneath the sur-

face, has been accomplished or suggested in a number of cases. While throwing
considerable light on the present discussion, the evidence they offer requires too

extensive examination to be more than mentioned at this time.

